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BAKKE TO THE WALL: THE CRISIS OF BAKKEAN
DIVERSITY
Gabriel J. Chin*
In the years since the United States Supreme Court's affirmative action holding
in Board of Regents v. Bakke, many educational institutions have struggled to
apply Bakke's doctrine to their admissions policymaking. Professor Chin asserts
that Bakke is incoherent because it does not explain whether the diversity it tries to
foster is cultural or racial. Furthermore, he argues that neither a racial nor a
cultural basis works under the Bakke scheme, leading to the difficulties schools
confront in framing an affirmative action program.
Focusing on law school admissions policies, Professor Chin argues that be-
cause of Bakke's weakness as law, it is largely ignored. He shows that many law
schools explicitly base their affirmative action programs on non-diversity grounds,
such as remedying societal discrimination or increasing the numbers of minority
professionals, despite Bakke and subsequent Supreme Court cases that find such
grounds illegal. In addition, many law schools that purport to have diversity pro-
grams instead have racially selective programs, perhaps suggesting that some non-
white races add to the quality of their academic programs while others do not.
Professor Chin concludes that schools' refusal to follow Bakke ultimately may
lead the Supreme Court to implement a strict colorblind rule. He proposes that
schools follow Bakke because its holding is better than the alternative-the remov-
al of affirmative action considerations from the admissions process. A Postscript to
this Article discusses the recent Fifth Circuit decision in Hopwood v. Texas, a case
in which the Circuit found the University of Texas Law School's admissions policy
to be unconstitutional.
INTRODUCTION
As Justice Lewis Powell's "diversity" rationale for affirmative action
admissions in higher education nears the end of its second decade of
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existence,' there is real doubt whether it will survive much longer. Affir-
mative action is in full retreat: the Supreme Court is increasingly hostile
to it;2 Republican presidential candidates denounce it;3 and even the Re-
gents of the University of California, the inventors of the plan attacked
in Board of Regents v. Bakke,4 recently voted to end race consciousness
in hiring and admissions.5
Ironically, Bakke may be jeopardized as much by friends of affirma-
tive action as by conservative backlash. Affirmative action plans often
treat Bakke not as controlling law, but as one not-very-appealing point of
view among many. As a result, plans are designed to achieve ends that
Bakke and other Supreme Court cases have held to be illegal. Proving by
their conduct both that Bakke is not being followed, and that it is not
worth being followed, these supporters of affirmative action may, para-
doxically, be the ones who ensure its demise. This Article identifies the
problems with Bakke that have led to its tepid reception and, using law
school admissions policies as an example, shows how it has been reject-
ed.
The conditions that created Bakke continue to prevail. The disparity
in traditional admissions criteria between white and minority applicants
is too large for schools to hope that many students of color will appear
on campus through the normal admissions process.6 Accordingly, unless
See Board of Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 311-20 (1978).
2 See, e.g., Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995) (holding that
federal minority set-aside program must satisfy strict scrutiny), overruling in part, Met-
ro Broadcasting v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990) (upholding constitutionality of federal set-
aside program); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (holding
unconstitutional local set-aside program); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S.
267 (1986) (holding unconstitutional layoff protection for minorities).
3 See David S. Broder & Robert A. Barnes, Few Governors Join Attack on Racial
Policies, WASH. POST, Aug. 2, 1995, at Al (noting that 1996 Republican presidential
candidate Robert Dole and then-candidates Phil Gramm and Pete Wilson oppose affir-
mative action).
438 U.S. 265 (1978).
Amy Wallace & Dave Lesher, U. C. Regents, In Historic Vote, Wipe Out Affirma-
tive Action Diversity, L.A. TIMES, July 21, 1995, at Al.
6 See LAW SCHOOL ADMISSIONS COUNCIL/LAW SCHOOL ADMISSIONS SERVICES,
MINORITY PARTICIPATION IN LEGAL EDUCATION AND THE PROFESSION: A COMPENDI-
UM OF DATA (1990) (hereinafter MINORITY DATABOOK). I do not concede that the
traditional measures of qualifications-LSAT scores and college grades-necessarily
capture anything fundamental about an individual's ability to succeed in law school or
to be a good lawyer, although they are not necessarily irrelevant. Cf Richard Delgado,
Rodrigo's Tenth Chronicle: Merit and Affirmative Action, 83 GEO. L.J. 1711 (1995).
Nevertheless, as a practical matter, I doubt that rethinking these measures will be effec-
tive. Most decision-makers in the legal academy got where they are in large part based
on their LSAT scores and college and law school GPAs. Accordingly, a policy that
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law schools are willing to accept a return to the days of virtually all-
white institutions, some kind of intervention is necessary. The challenge
university administrators face is that the tools they have been given to
achieve minority representation have been circumscribed by the Supreme
Court. In Bakke, the Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Powell,
rejected most justifications for affirmative action for minority groups.7
In the absence of prior discrimination, the Court left schools only promo-
tion of "diversity" as a ground for taking race into account in admis-
sions.8 Accordingly, Part I of this Article briefly describes the formal
limitations imposed by Bakke, and the diversity justification it left avail-
able.
Part II suggests that Bakke's diversity rationale is unsatisfying in
principle. Bakke does not clearly identify the value it intended to pro-
mote; as a result, it is hard to construct a program to achieve diversity.
The most obvious possible goals of Bakke do not work. If Bakke was
meant to promote diversity of culture per se, then it rapidly becomes
unmanageable, as scores or hundreds of cultures justly claim equal repre-
sentation under affirmative action plans adopted by schools. If the char-
acteristic Bakke found diversifying was race alone, distinct from culture,
other problems arise. How, for example, could such a rationale justify a
group preference for Latinos and Latinas, who can be of any race?
Moreover, the question of why race is important apart from its cultural
content is not explained; the most obvious explanation-that members of
the same race bear similarities in spite of what may be vast cultural dif-
ferences-is problematic because it seems deeply racist.
Part III assumes away any conceptual difficulties with Bakke for the
purpose of examining how the diversity principle has been applied in
practice. Significant portions of the academic community have shown
that diversity per se is not the sole basis for race-based affirmative ac-
tion, even though for most schools it is the only basis in law. First, many
schools and the American Bar Association itself explicitly rely on the
justification of remedying past societal discrimination rather than promo-
tion of diversity alone. This rationale is legally foreclosed by Bakke and
its progeny. Second, many affirmative action programs are racially selec-
tive, offering benefits to some racial groups but not to others. This is
inconsistent with the diversity rationale, as well as impermissible under
Bakke.
requires them-us-to admit that we might not be as meritorious as we think we are
will face significant resistance.
See infra notes 18-26 and accompanying text.
8 See infra notes 27-33 and accompanying text.
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Part IV discusses the consequences of the academic community's re-
jection of Bakke. One critical effect is that Bakke is an easy target for
overruling. Real evidence supports the argument that Bakke has not prov-
en to be a workable model. Another important consequence of Bakke's
unworkable nature is that law schools apparently have felt free to imple-
ment whatever programs they think just. Grounding programs on other
rationales, however, may suggest that diversity is a pretext. In addition,
the lack of clear standards has given rise to discrimination against racial
minority groups who are not the beneficiaries of particular affirmative
action programs. Nevertheless, as unsatisfying as Bakke and its conse-
quences may be, refusing to follow it is worse.9
I. THE LEGAL BASIS FOR LAW SCHOOL AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: BOARD OF
REGENTS V. BAKKE
Bakke is the starting point for all non-remedial affirmative action
analysis in education. Allan Bakke, a white male, was twice denied ad-
mission to the University of California at Davis Medical School in spite
of the fact that his grades and Medical College Admissions Test
(MCAT) scores were much higher than those of some minority appli-
cants who were admitted.1" In response to his second denial, Bakke
challenged Davis's affirmative action program, which set an admissions
target for members of certain minority groups, on the grounds that the
program violated his constitutional right to equal protection of the laws
and the statutory prohibition against racial discrimination in federally
funded programs."
A divided Supreme Court upheld Bakke's claim in part. Justice
Powell concluded that although the specific affirmative action program
was unconstitutional and violated Title VI of the Civil Rights Act,12
' A reader might claim that this Article flinches from the logical conclusion of its
argument. Why not overrule Bakke if it is so bad? The answer is that there is nothing to
replace Bakke if it is overruled. At present, many elite campuses would have a racially
homogeneous student body without some race-consciousness in admissions. In my view,
it would be unjust for important social institutions to be without representation from
discrete social groups. Bakke is the only doctrinal justification for steps to ensure such
representations happen. That being said, I believe that the long term solution to Bakke's
weaknesses and the question of racial justice does not lie in affirmative action. Rather, I
have faith that there is an approach or series of approaches that will result in America
being a nation which is hospitable to all of her citizens, and in which the characteristic
of race is not such a powerful predictor of social position. I, however, do not know
what that approach should be.
10 Board of Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 265 (1978).
" Id. at 277-78.
12 Id. at 319-20 (citing Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d
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race could, under some circumstances, be taken into account as a legiti-
mate factor in a program intended to achieve diversity among the student
body.13 Justice Stevens, joined by three other Justices, concluded that
Title VI prohibited race-based decision-making, and thus concurred in
the result; he found it unnecessary to reach the constitutional issue.14
Justice Brennan and three other Justices, however, agreed with Justice
Powell that the school could consider race as a factor in a program
aimed at achieving a diverse student body.15
Justice Powell's opinion probably represents the holding of the Court,
at least to the extent that it interpreted Title VI. "When a fragmented
Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys
the assent of five Justices, 'the holding of the Court may be viewed as
that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments
on the narrowest grounds."'1.6 Four members of the Court said that re-
medial, "benign" preferences were usually in accord with Title VI and
the Fourteenth Amendment. Four members of the Court said that racial
discrimination was flatly prohibited by Title VI. Because Powell said
that racial preferences were usually illegal, his view of the circumstances
when Such programs are permitted generally represents the narrowest
ground of concurrence. 7
Justice Powell identified a number of asserted interests as being in-
sufficiently compelling to warrant racial classifications. U.C.- Davis
claimed that "reducing the historic deficit of traditionally disfavored
minorities" was a sufficient justification for use of racial classifica-
tions,18 but Powell rejected this appeal for distributive justice:
(1988)).
'3 Id. at 312-15.
14 Id. at 412-13 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in parti
joined by Burger, C.J., Stewart & Rehnquist, JJ.). Although some ambiguity exists in
the Stevens opinion, this is its most plausible reading. See Vincent Blasi, Bakke as
Precedent: Does Mr. Justice Powell Have a Theory?, 67 CAL. L. REV. 21, 24-30
(1979). At a minimum, racial classification clearly is not permitted for the reasons ad-
vanced by U.C. Davis.
" Bakke, 438 U.S. at 324-26 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment in part and dis-
senting in part, joined by White, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ.). The Brennan group would
have upheld the program on broader grounds, but agreed that a diversity plan would be
constitutional under their approach. Id. at 326 n.1 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
"' Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153, 169 n.i5 (1976)).
17 Arguably, the Brennan group's rationale was narrower. See infra notes 195-98 and
accompanying text.
" Bakke, 438 U.S. at 306.
1996]
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
If petitioner's purpose is to assure within its student body
some specified percentage of a particular group merely be-
cause of its race or ethnic origin, such a preferential purpose
must be rejected not as insubstantial but as facially invalid.
Preferring members of any one group for no other reason
than race or ethnic origin is discrimination for its own sake.
This the Constitution forbids. 9
This aspect of the Bakke decision remains solidly entrenched in the law. 0
Justice Powell also rejected the argument that a preference was a legiti-
mate remedy for past societal discrimination: "We have never approved a
classification that aids persons perceived as members of relatively victimized
groups at the expense of other innocent individuals in the absence of judi-
cial, legislative, or administrative findings of constitutional or statutory
violations."'" This holding has also been embraced by subsequent cases.'
Bakke recognized that an institution may act to remedy its own prior dis-
crimination,23 but most United States law schools will be unable to demon-
strate a history of constitutional or statutory violations sufficient to warrant
such a remedial program2 4
'9 Id. at 307.
o See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 496 (1989) (noting that
in Bakke "[f]ive Members of the Court determined that [neither increasing the number
of disfavored minorities who were doctors nor countering the effects of societal dis-
crimination] could justify a plan that completely eliminated nonminorities from con-
sideration for a specified percentage of opportunities"). Many lower federal courts also
have followed Justice Powell's view. See, e.g., Associated Gen. Contractors v. City of
S.F., 813 F.2d 922, 935 (9th Cir. 1987); Hammon v. Barry, 813 F.2d 412, 431 (D.C.
Cir. 1987) (relying on Bakke and Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 475-77
(1986), to hold that under the Constitution, "discrimination on grounds of race is abso-
lutely forbidden if the purpose is to achieve racial balance"), cert. denied, 486 U.S.
1036 (1988); Hayes v. City of Charlotte, 802 F. Supp. 1361, 1376 (W.D.N.C. 1992),
affd in part, vacated in part, 10 F.3d 207 (4th Cir. 1993); Davis v. Halpern, 768 F.
Supp. 968, 980-81 (E.D.N.Y. 1991); Covington v. Beaumont Indep. Sch. Dist., 714 F.
Supp. 1402, 1409 (E.D. Tex. 1989); Slade v. Billington, 700 F. Supp. 1134, 1147
(D.D.C. 1988), aft'd, 871 F.2d 155 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Peters v. Moses, 613 F. Supp.
1328, 1334 (W.D. Va. 1985); Uzzell v. Friday, 592 F. Supp. 1502, 1520 (M.D.N.C.
1984).
21 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307.
2 See, e.g., Croson, 488 U.S. at 497.
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307-10; see also Croson, 488 U.S. at 490-93, 509 (holding
that city could employ remedial program if it had become a passive participant in the
discrimination of others).
2 Since the adoption of ABA Accreditation Standards in 1973, all member schools
have been prohibited from discriminating on the basis of race. See APPROVAL OF LAW
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Justice Powell also found that the Regents could not defend their pro-
gram on the ground that special admissions would improve "the delivery of
health care services to communities currently underserved."' Although
Powell did not deny that providing needed medical services could constitute
a compelling interest, or even that special admittees would be more likely to
serve those communities, he concluded that "there are more precise and
reliable ways to identify applicants who are genuinely interested in medical
problems of minorities than by race."26
The "attainment of a diverse student body" was, according to Powell, a
compelling interest for an educational institution.27 He noted: "The atmo-
sphere of 'speculation, experiment and creation'-so essential to the quality
of higher education-is widely believed to be promoted by a diverse student
body." Nevertheless, Powell determined that even a "diversity" program
was unconstitutional if it focused on the single factor of race:
It is not an interest in simple ethnic diversity, in which a
specified percentage of the student body is in effect guaran-
teed to members of selected ethnic groups, with the remain-
ing percentage an undifferentiated aggregation of students.
The diversity that furthers a compelling state interest encom-
passes a far broader array of qualifications and characteris-
tics of which racial or ethnic origin is but a single though
important element. Petitioner's special admissions program,
focused solely on ethnic diversity, would hinder rather than
further attainment of genuine diversity.29
Accordingly, Justice Powell approved of programs where "race or ethnic
background may be deemed a 'plus' in a particular applicant's file, yet it
does not insulate the individual from comparison with all other candidates
for the available seats."3 Thus, the Court found no "facial infirmity ... in
an admissions program where race or ethnic background is simply one ele-
ment-to be weighed fairly against other elements-in the selection pro-
cess."
31
SCHOOLS: AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION STANDARDS AND RULES OF PROCEDURE § 211
(1973). Additionally, schools receiving federal funds have been prohibited from such
discrimination since 1964 by virtue of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000d (1988).
' Bakke, 438 U.S. at 310.
26 Id. at 311.
27 Id.
2 Id. at 312.
29 Id. at 315.
30 Id. at 317.
31 Id. at 318.
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Justice Powell attached the Harvard College Admissions Program as an
appendix to his opinion, apparently in the belief that it was the kind of
program appropriately calculated to achieve true diversity. 32 The Harvard
program set no quotas, but the admissions committee recognized that some
minimum diversity was necessary as a practical matter:
[I]f Harvard College is to provide a truly heterogen[e]ous
environment that reflects the rich diversity of the United
States, it cannot be provided without some attention to num-
bers. It would not make sense, for example, to have 10 or 20
students out of 1,100 whose homes are west of the Missis-
sippi. Comparably, 10 or 20 black students could not begin
to bring to their classmates and to each other the variety of
points of view, backgrounds and experiences of blacks in the
United States. Their small numbers might also create a sense
of isolation among the black students themselves and thus
make it more difficult for them to develop and achieve their
potential. Consequently, when making its decisions, the
Committee on Admissions is aware that there is some rela-
tionship between numbers and achieving the benefits to be
derived from a diverse student body, and between numbers
and providing a reasonable environment for those students
admitted."
The Bakke diversity rationale has been embraced at the level of rhetoric
by academics and commentators. "Differences and distinctions between
people," argues one proponent of diversity, "benefit the educational environ-
ment by making the environment more conducive to education by filling the
air with a vast array of distinct and dissimilar thoughts. Placing dissimilar
students together enables and compels them to learn from one another."'
The idea that diversity promotes academic excellence is widely repeated:
In educational settings, the diversity principle has been de-
veloped as a means to promote educational excellence
through exposure to a wide variety of viewpoints and ideas
in the classroom and in scholarship . . . . Moreover, the
benefits of such diversity are deemed to extend not only to
members of those underrepresented minority groups who
32 Id. at 316.
33 Id. at 323 (alteration in original).
31 Vince Herron, Note, Increasing the Speech: Diversity, Campus Speech Codes, and
the Pursuit of Truth, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 407, 407 (1994).
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may benefit from the policies at issue, but also on the major-
ity recipients of such viewpoints.35
Similarly, Stanford Dean Paul Brest testified that his school's diversity
policy rests on a belief that diversity is directly connected to the quality of
the educational program:
[T]here are few major areas of legal doctrine, of legal policy,
that don't have implications with respect to race, ethnicity
and a whole variety of other factors of that sort.
And in order to explore them in a vigorous way in the
classroom, it seems to me and my colleagues that it is im-
portant to have students who bring different perspectives to
the discussion of that doctrine.'
Another educator writes:
[A] law school should value the recruitment of students and
faculty from diverse backgrounds because regardless of the
political programs to which these individuals subscribe, the
varied experiences they bring to the educational process and
share with their colleagues contribute importantly to better
illumination of the matters being taught and studied.37
This rhetoric is often consistent with Bakke's focus on pedagogical, as
opposed to remedial, ends. As a commentator explained:
The diversity justification requires no directly compensatory
purpose, but rather seeks to challenge harmful stereotypes,
combat intolerance, and realize intellectual and competitive
benefits by creating inclusive workplaces and educational
institutions. Though terms such as "exclusion" and "outsid-
ers" almost invariably relate to a history of subordination
3 Sheila Foster, Difference and Equality: A Critical Assessment of the Concept of
"Diversity", 1993 Wis. L. REV. 105, 138-39; see also Judith Areen, Affirmative Action:
The Benefits of Diversity, WASH. POST, May 26, 1991, at D7.
36 22 Trial Transcript at 22, Hopwood v. Texas, 861 F. Supp. 551 (W.D. Tex. 1994)
(No. A-92-CA-563-SS), [hereinafter Hopwood Transcript].
37 J. Clifton Fleming, Jr., Thoughts About Pursuing Diversity in Legal Education for
Pedagogical Rather Than Political or Compensatory Reasons: A Review Essay on Ste-
phen L. Carter's "Reflections of an Affirmative Action Baby", 36 How. L.J. 291, 300
(1993) (book review).
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and discrimination, affirmative action justified by diversity
focuses solely on the benefits derived from inclusion. Indeed,
the many practical benefits of diversity in the workplace
have become increasingly popular justification for
nonremedial, voluntary affirmative action.38
Accordingly, "the recruitment of persons from different backgrounds is
appropriate, not for overarching political ends, but for achieving the more
modest, but still important objectives of enriching legal education and mak-
ing the learning experience more vibrant for both majority and minority
participants."3"
The notion that racial diversity per se contributes to educational diversi-
ty has been criticized because it assumes that a person's viewpoint may be
presumed from their skin color." Regardless of the merits of that criticism,
it is an assumption the Supreme Court has been willing to make.4' Educa-
tional diversity continues to justify affirmative action programs in school
admissions programs.
II. BAKKE'S WEAKNESS AS LAW
A central defect of Justice Powell's decision is its failure to identify a
reason for diversity which is sufficiently clear and specific that it can be
used to design a program for diversity admissions. Although Justice Powell
told us that diversity was good, he did not explain what characteristics
would contribute to achieving diversity. Accordingly, Bakke is not very
useful in determining who should be admitted to schools to achieve diversi-
ty. Because Justice Powell purported to apply strict scrutiny in Bakke, and
because the current Supreme Court is likely to apply that standard of review
to any new plan, this lack of explanation is particularly worrisome.
38 Jeffrey S. Byrne, Affirmative Action for Lesbians and Gay Men: A Proposal for
True Equality of Opportunity and Workforce Diversity, 11 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 47,
71 (1993) (footnotes omitted).
39 Fleming, supra note 37, at 302.
40 See, e.g., STEPHEN L. CARTER, REFLECTIONS OF AN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION BABY
29-45 (1991).
41 In Metro Broadcasting v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990), overruled in part by
Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995), the Court concluded that racial
diversity in and of itself would lead to other kinds of diversity: "A broadcasting indus-
try with representative minority participation will produce more variation and diversity
than will one whose ownership is drawn from a single racially and ethnically homoge-
neous group." Id. at 579. Although certain features of Metro Broadcasting were over-
ruled in Adarand, this factual assumption may be intact.
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To survive strict scrutiny, a racial classification must be "narrowly tai-
lored" to achieve a compelling interest.42 Narrow tailoring "ensures that the
means chosen 'fit' this compelling goal so closely that there is little or no
possibility that the motive for the classification was illegitimate racial preju-
dice or stereotype."43 Recent Supreme Court decisions have demanded, as
an essential feature of a narrowly tailored solution, a clear basis for includ-
ing particular groups that benefit from the classification." In a remedial
affirmative action admissions program, for example, the compelling interest
provides a very satisfying means of determining who should be helped and
who should not.45 If a school discriminated against only African-Americans
in admissions, a narrowly tailored solution would grant a remedy to that
group. The compelling interest of remedying discrimination against only
African-Americans explains why other racial groups are not included in the
remedy. The link between goal and remedy is close. Although it now seems
clear that "strict scrutiny will be mercilessly harsh on loosely crafted affir-
mative action programs,"46 Bakke does not offer a convincing means of
calculating who should be helped. The four most promising means for cal-
culating who should be helped-representation according to population,
maximization of cultural diversity, cultural selectivity, and maximization of
racial diversity--do not stand up to close examination.
A. Representation Proportional to Population
Achieving diversity through representation proportional to population is
an appealing solution to the problem of who should be included in a diversi-
42 See, e.g., Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2101.
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989); see also Wygant
v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 280 n.6 (1986) (plurality opinion) (discussing
"narrowly tailored" requirement of strict scrutiny); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448,
537 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting "[r]acial classifications are simply too perni-
cious to permit any but the most exact connection between justification and classifica-
tion").
4' Croson, 488 U.S. at 505 (observing that "[t]he random inclusion of racial groups
that, as a practical matter, may never have suffered from discrimination in the construc-
tion industry in Richmond suggests that perhaps the city's purpose was not in fact to
remedy past discrimination"); Wygant, 476 U.S. at 284 n.13 (noting that "[t]he Board's
definition of minority to include blacks, Orientals, American Indians, and persons of
Spanish descent further illustrates the undifferentiated nature of the plan") (citation
omitted).
"' Identification of the compelling interest does not necessarily, in and of itself,
explain how that interest is to be achieved. Cf. Missouri v. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. 2038
(1995) (striking down program implemented by district court to achieve desegregation
of school system).
46 K.G. Jan Pillai, Affirmative Action: In Search of a National Policy, 2 TEMP. POL.
& Civ. RTs. L. REV. 1, 12 (1992).
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ty program. Such a plan would be easy to implement and administer: identi-
fy the racial and cultural makeup of the school's applicant base, and offer
preferences aimed at achieving a student population proportionally identical
to that makeup. Indeed, in practice, sufficiency of representation in a school
or profession is sometimes measured by a comparison of the percentage of
the group in the profession to the percentage in the population. 47 The goals
of Bakkean diversity, however, cannot be satisfied by giving each group
representation proportional to population, and therefore representation cannot
necessarily be linked to any extrinsic measure of population.
The theory of Bakkean diversity is that it may be beneficial for persons
who are not members of a particular group to have contact with others who
are. Accordingly, the number of minority students admitted is driven not by
the percentage of minorities in the population, but by the number needed to
achieve the goal of educational diversity. As the Harvard Plan explained,
because
10 or 20 black students could not begin to bring to their
classmates and to each other the variety of points of view,
backgrounds and experiences of blacks in the United
States ... there is some relationship between numbers and
achieving the benefits to be derived from a diverse student
body.4
This is a generic principle which, if true at all, is applicable to all groups,
not just African-Americans.49
It seems likely that the goal of exposing students, white and minority, to
members of other groups would be ideally satisfied through a school having
See, e.g., DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 338-39 (1974) (Douglas, J., dis-
senting) (noting the difficulty of admissions committee at the University of Washington
Law School in evaluating the claims of Japanese-Americans, who constituted two per-
cent of the population and two percent of the bar).
48 Board of Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 323 (1978).
4' This point is supported by the testimony of Dean Mark G. Yudof of the Universi-
ty of Texas, which had a 10% admissions goal for Mexican-Americans, but only a five
percent goal for African-Americans. When asked why twice as many Mexican-Ameri-
cans as blacks were needed to achieve diversity, Dean Yudof indicated that the differ-
ence was related not to achievement of diversity per se, but rather to remedying past
discrimination:
Diversity is just one of the factors. If you are interested in quality students and
you're interested in the integration of the bench and bar and training leaders and
you're trying to redress past discrimination, diversity is but one factor, and if the
whole system [were justified] by just diversity, my personal view is that the pro-
gram would not be as large as it is today.
20 Hopwood Transcript, supra note 36, at 42-43.
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roughly the same number of members of every group. That is, if a school
determines that X percent of its student body, ideally, should be African-
American in order "to bring to their classmates and to each other the variety
of points of view, backgrounds and experiences of blacks in the United
States,"5 it is hard to see how .iX percent representation of Native Amer-
icans could provide the same kind of enrichment to the non-Native Ameri-
can students.5' The Native Americans in that group would have to have ten
times as many contacts with the other students, or many non-Native students
would not get the benefit of interaction with a person of that background.
This result is acceptable only if the school is less concerned with exposing
other students to Native American culture than to African-American culture.
In addition, there is no necessary relationship between the percentage of
a group in the population of the state, nation, world, or applicant pool, and
the representation of that group in the school population necessary to
achieve diversity.52 As Professor Greenawalt observed:
it should not be assumed that because some preferential rep-
resentation of a group is permitted to encourage diversity,
members of that group can be admitted on a preferential
basis until they constitute the same percentage of the student
body as their percentage of the general population. It is not
certain, for example, that relevant communication between
blacks and whites will be much greater if the student body is
ten per cent black than if it is five per cent black. Of course,
it may be unfair to impose on a small number of blacks the
responsibility to communicate the "black experience" to a
large number of whites; but a law school justifying its pref-
s Bakke, 438 U.S. at 323.
5' Cf. J. HARVIE WILKINSON III, FROM BROWN TO BAKKE: THE SUPREME COURT
AND SCHOOL INTEGRATION: 1954-1978, at 282 (1979) ("To work, diversity required
more than token numbers . . . . A few blacks, moreover, could no more communicate
the 'black experience' to whites than a Montanan or two could convey the 'big sky'
country to the City University of New York.").
s2 Robert M. O'Neil, Bakke in Balance: Some Preliminary Thoughts, 67 CAL. L.
REV. 143, 160-61 (1979) (noting that because programs designed to mirror population
are suspect in light of Bakke, "a general range of minority representation, or perhaps
even a presumptive minimum, is more likely to show a genuine quest for flexibility
than a target percentage tied strictly to the demography of the state or region");
Terrence Sandalow, Racial Preferences in Higher Education: Political Responsibility
and the Judicial Role, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 653, 685 n.96 (1975) (observing that "[t]here
is no 'rational connection between seeking proportional representation of minorities, on
the one hand, and enhancing the quality of the educational experience by providing
some representation for members of minority groups who could not gain admission on
the basis of academic promise alone, on the other"').
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erential policies in terms of law school diversity should make
some effort to decide how widely applicable racial preferenc-
es should be to achieve adequate diversity.53
In short, if the representation of a particular minority group in the general
population is large, the goal of diversity might be achieved even if the per-
centage of that group in the student body was lower than its representation
in the general population. If, by contrast, a particular minority group is
small compared to the general population, then "overrepresentation" of that
group might be necessary to achieve diversity, because, as the Harvard Plan
pointed out, minority "presence in very small numbers[] may significantly
detract from the educational experience of those students who are admit-
ted. ,54
Relatedly, no necessary connection exists between the groups to be ben-
efitted by affirmative action and the racial or cultural composition of the
community, professional or otherwise, that the graduates will face. Diversi-
ty-based affirmative action was not justified in Bakke, and it cannot be justi-
fied on the ground that it is helpful as a practical matter for non-African-
American students to have African-American classmates so that they can
learn how to deal with African-American colleagues and clients in the fu-
ture. Such a rationale would not justify affirmative action programs in a
state or region with a low minority population if most law school graduates
remained in the area. Yet the educational value of a diversity program in
such a school would be just as strong, and perhaps more so, than in a com-
munity that was already more racially diverse.
Moreover, one of the premises of affirmative action is that the ordinary
admissions process will not result in a large number of minority profession-
als. Were this not true-if the demographics of the institutions employing
affirmative action were largely the same even without such programs-there
would be no justification for such programs. In short, it appears that the
goals of diversity would be best satisfied if each minority group was repre-
sented by more-or-less the same number of students.
B. Cultural Diversity
Justice Powell did not state precisely whether the compelling interest is
diversity of race or diversity of culture. His citation of the Harvard Program
as the primary example of a program that would satisfy Bakke perhaps
makes it too easy to avoid this hard question. Although the African-Amer-
ican community is by no means monolithic, they share a common language,
" Kent Greenawalt, Judicial Scrutiny of "Benign" Racial Preferences in Law School
Admissions, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 559, 591 (1975) (footnotes omitted).
"4 Sandalow, supra note 52, at 685 (footnote omitted).
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unlike Asian-Americans and Native Americans. Furthermore, unlike Latinos
and Latinas, African-Americans share a common race. Until recently, virtu-
ally all African-Americans were the descendants of former slaves, and they
had this important history in common. Thus, although even for African-
Americans there was never a perfect identity between race and culture, it
might have been justifiable for Powell to think that there was a fair degree
of correlation between the two. However, expansion of this idea to Asian-
Americans, Latinos and Latinas, and Native Americans simply does not
work. For these groups, there must be a choice between race and culture.
If the ideal institution would have equality in its representation of every
group, culture cannot be the determinative category. Even treating culture as
synonymous with national heritage,55 there are scores upon scores of
Asian-American, Native American, and Latinos and Latinas national sub-
groups such as Korean-Americans and Mexican-Americans, each of which
would be entitled to have attention paid to its numbers under a Harvard-
style plan.
Moreover, if culture is the touchstone, then it seems hard to defend a
failure to include white subcultures. Although whites as a race are well-
represented in American higher education, little attention is paid to making
sure it is a culturally diverse group of whites. To be sure, there is some
concern for geographical diversity, but that seems to be more of a recruiting
stunt than a genuine commitment to white cultural diversity. 6 If no one
cares about, say, Irish-American admission rates, it is not because Irish-
American culture is moribund or uninteresting. 7 Finally, the argument that
Irish-Americans or Italian-Americans will take care of themselves in admis-
sions is less likely to apply to smaller groups like Armenian-Americans or
to disadvantaged whites like Appalachians.
C. Cultural Selectivity
One way to avoid degeneration into unmanageability would be to make
a decision that some cultures are going to be helped, and some are going to
be left to fend for themselves. This cure would be dreadful. How would
such preferred groups be chosen? The Court has foreclosed racial classifica-
" Culture clearly is not synonymous with national heritage. A nation-the United
States being a prime example--does not necessarily have a monolithic culture. Even
nations far more homogeneous than the United States, such as Switzerland and Bel-
gium, may have more than one distinct culture.
56 Accordingly, it is probable that a school seeks a Nebraska farm girl not because
she is, necessarily, so different from the Iowa farm girl already admitted, but so the
school can say "we draw our student body from all 50 states."
s7 Cf THE AMERICAN IRISH REVIVAL: A DECADE OF THE RECORDER, 1974-1983
(Kevin M. Cahill ed., 1984) (discussing some of the cultural contributions of Irish-
Americans in the United States).
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tion based on remedying historical discrimination, so that otherwise promis-
ing avenue could not be a basis. 8 Relying on purely political grounds-if a
group has the power to obtain a preference, fine; if not, too bad-seems
both unappealing and unjustifiable as an exercise of the sensitive power of
racial classification.
Stanford Dean Paul Brest and Miranda Oshige offer the most sophisti-
cated argument in favor of selectivity, which, although thoughtful, illustrates
the practical difficulty with this kind of solution. They advocate a system
that is unabashedly arbitrary and discretionary. 9 Recognizing that there are
many different cultures that could be included,6" they offer "salience" as a
criterion for determining which groups should be offered a preference by a
particular school:
In deciding whom to include in an affirmative action pro-
gram, a law school might appropriately consider the salience
of the group in contemporary American society or in the
geographic region in which its graduates tend to practice.
Among the determinants of a group's salience are its numeri-
cal size and the extent to which its culture differs from the
dominant culture of students attending the school.6'
The authors further assert that "the opportunity to encounter people from
different backgrounds and cultures allows students to explore the nature of
those differences and to learn to communicate across the boundaries they
create .... Even more is gained by learning about particular cultures likely
to be encountered in one's personal and professional life."62
Dean Brest and Ms. Oshige insist that educators should be given broad
discretion in choosing groups to favor:
[I]n view of the vast number of groups and subgroups that
are arguable candidates for such programs, it suggests that
policymakers may reasonably come to different conclusions
about which groups to include, and that different institutions
may appropriately decide to focus on different groups, based,
for example, on the demography of the region. To decide not
58 See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 470 (1989).
'9 "Any diversity or affirmative action policy is likely to reflect the local history of
a particular institution and is bound to be somewhat arbitrary with respect to the groups
that it includes." Paul Brest & Miranda Oshige, Affirmative Action for Whom?, 47
STAN. L. REV. 855, 856 (1995).
60 Id. at 873.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 862-63.
896 [Vol. 4:3
THE CRISIS OF BAKKEAN DIVERSITY
to include a particular group in an affirmative action program
does not entail complacency about its members' circumstanc-
es.
63
This scheme is horrifying for a variety of reasons. First, to the extent
that the authors are concerned with off-campus effects, the program seems
inconsistent with Bakke, which, of course, determined that several non-peda-
gogical effects were insufficient to constitute compelling interests.' The
idea that a program designed to help students succeed by offering them
cultural exposure to their likely future customers and colleagues could sur-
vive strict scrutiny is troubling, because it would seem to permit discrimina-
tion in favor of the largest and most "salient" American racial group:
whites. The structure is also political in a particularly pernicious way. Only
relatively weak, small groups can be excluded, for groups with the power to
avoid subordination would be unlikely to allow themselves to be branded as
non-salient.
More fundamentally, selectivity represents an institutional judgment
about the merits, importance, and value of a particular group. It may well be
impossible for excluded groups, comprising whole races of people, to avoid
reading their exclusion as meaning anything other than a determination that
"you are just not salient, at least not here at our school." Which races spe-
cifically, Dean Brest and Ms. Oshige, are so irrelevant to American society
that they are not "salient" in a law school's educational program?
The authors' suggestion permits a bootstrapping, self-fulfilling prophesy,
given the authors' assumption that "but for affirmative action, there would
be significantly fewer students from certain minority groups in many of the
nation's law schools."65 If the elite law schools decide that, for example,
Native Americans are salient but Puerto Ricans are not, then there will be in
the future more Native Americans among the elite lawyers and fewer Puerto
Ricans-but the fact that the opposite result would obtain if Puerto Ricans
had been found "salient" rather than Native Americans suggests that salience
is an empty concept. The self-fulfilling nature of the salience label is even
more apparent in the context of academic programs. An academic lawyer's
understanding of the "role law has played in [a group's] history, 66 will be
determined by the interest that has been shown by previous generations of
scholars. The groups that have been considered of legal interest in the past
63 Id. at 900.
'.See Board of Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 310-11 (1978) (noting that goal of
providing health care to underserved communities is insufficient to constitute compel-
ling interest); see also supra text accompanying notes 18-26.
' Brest & Oshige, supra note 59, at 857.
6 Id. at 880.
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will continue to benefit from that attention, while less prominent groups will
continue to be ignored.
Moreover, the authors' scheme appears to permit discrimination against
blacks. Imagine a school in a state with a small black population, little his-
tory of de jure discrimination against blacks, and in which a different non-
white group played a larger historical role and has a larger population rela-
tive to blacks. Under the criteria set forth, the law school might "reason-
ably" conclude that another group is salient, while blacks are not. Ironically,
affirmative action, which Brest and Oshige acknowledge was designed to
help blacks, could, through application of the concept of salience, be turned
against them. Indeed, if schools are free to decide that some races "belong"
more than others and to allocate scarce spots based on that belief, then it is
hard to identify precisely what was wrong with segregation in the first
place.
At bottom, Brest and Oshige seem to reject the notions underlying the
presumption against racial classifications in precisely the context in which
they are most acutely needed-the determination of what colors belong, are
good, and matter. They seem to think that these kinds of racial choices are
so likely to be correct and unbiased that they should be treated deferentially.
They find an almost entirely subjective and manipulable multi-factor analy-
sis-which, depending on the emphasis placed by a particular decision-mak-
er on a particular factor, could lead to any result-perfectly sufficient to
protect against abuse. The problem, which they recognize, is that "[p]olicies
that seem 'neutral' to a dominant group may have quite different meanings
for the members of other racial or ethnic groups."67 Therefore, when, as is
contemplated by their system, a group of Americans is told that it does not
count, and not to worry, because that determination was made carefully and
after much thought, it will be justifiably suspicious. The authors offer no
means of determining whether a particular decision is a dispassionate and
correct weighing of all relevant factors rather than an exercise of old-fash-
ioned discrimination. If we live in a world ihat is largely free from discrimi-
nation, we do not need affirmative action. If, on the other hand, we live in a
world that has not yet achieved the goal of equality, then a program which
assumes that decision-makers usually make unbiased decisions based on
race is unwise."
67 Id. at 862.
68 Other possible cultural solutions avoid the hierarchy problem but raise others.
Cultures could be chosen, for instance, based on their dissimilarity to the majority cul-
ture. But how could this possibly be determined? Which is more different from white
American culture: descendants of Uruguayan tribe members or descendants of Hmong
villagers? These questions seem unintelligible and answerable only in an arbitrary way.
Or, cultures could be chosen based on the extent to which the majority culture is unfa-
miliar with them; presumably the less they are known, the greater the educational effect
their presence would have. This would have some of the same arbitrariness problems,
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D. Racial Diversity
The problems arising from understanding Bakke as largely being con-
cerned with culture can be elided by treating the case as based on race. In-
stead of the virtual impossibility of dividing the pie among members of
multitudinous cultures, law school administrators could ignore culture and
consider only the finite number of racial groups. Practically, it would be
easy to identify the races69 and allocate each of them an equal share. In
that case, however, a new set of challenges to Bakke appears.
If diversity represents a concern for racial inclusion, and diversity is
divorced from the association of race with culture, what happens to Latinos
and Latinas? Latinos and Latinas can be of any race, so it is hard to justify
having an independent concern for Latino and Latina whites, blacks, Asians,
and Native Americans, if other racial subcultures are not entitled to consid-
eration. Because Latinos and Latinas are very often included in affirmative
action admissions programs, and because they were included in the Davis
program reviewed in Bakke, the conclusion that Latinos and Latinas are not
a group cognizable under a diversity program would be remarkable.
Moreover, Powell could not have meant to focus on race divorced from
culture. He wrote: "Preferring members of any one group for no reason
other than race or ethnic origin is discrimination for its own sake."7 This
clearly suggests that he was interested in something beyond biology or skin
and would have paradoxical results in that whites are probably more familiar with the
cultures of the larger racial groups, such as African-Americans and Latinos and Latinas,
which are usually included in affirmative action programs, than the smaller ones, such
as Asian-Americans and Native Americans, which sometimes are not included. Another
solution would be to aggregate cultures; a school could determine, for example, that
"Central Americans" are similar and thus have a goal for them as a group, rather than
an individual goal for descendants of every country in Central America. It is probably
not too much to assume that few law school faculty admissions committees would be
prepared to aggregate the world's cultures in an informed way. Moreover, this solution
would have the feature of arbitrariness that is problematic for a narrowly tailored solu-
tion.
69 There is, however, some debate about whether there is any such thing as race.
See, e.g., Christopher Ford, Administering Identity: The Determination of "Race" in
Race-Conscious Law, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1231 (1994). Nevertheless, many people clearly
think that races exist. In at least one context, the law has given definitional force to the
"common understanding" of that which constitutes a race. See, e.g., United States v.
Thind, 261 U.S. 204, 214-15 (1923) (finding that provision of a statute allowing natu-
ralization of "free white persons" was "to be interpreted in accordance with the under-
standing of the common man," thus excluding natives of India).
70 Board of Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307 (1978).
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color. In addition, the Harvard Plan he endorsed also made distinctions
between African-Americans of different backgrounds, suggesting that it was
not race per se that motivated the preference.7
What could justify treating race as an intelligible organizing category,
from Powell's point of view, if it is not the association of race with particu-
lar cultures? Perhaps race can provide clues about possible viewpoints and
cultural background. Based on these associations, it might be reasonable to
assume that minorities, as a group, will have different views than whites on
some issues.72 This was the notion underlying Justice Brennan's majority
opinion in Metro Broadcasting v. FCC.73 The Court in Metro Broadcasting
assumed that there are differences between whites and non-whites, but if the
Bakke decision divides by race rather than culture, it assumes meaningful
similarities between those of similar racial background. This presumption of
similarity is unwarranted. If the Bakke standard would consider a fourth
generation Japanese-American in Sacramento to be much the same as a
freshly naturalized Vietnamese-American in Texas, it is wrong. If this is the
rationale behind Bakke, it is more than erroneous-it is racist; such a ratio-
nale takes the old slur that minority racial groups "all look alike" one step
further: it maintains that they actually are all alike.
Of course, Bakke was motivated by a concern for the education of stu-
dents who were already in the educational institution-whites. One could
argue that because white students may see Native Americans or Latinos and
Latinas as "all being alike," the white definition should control. Even as-
suming that such a simplistic view accurately represents the understanding
of whites, there is no reason to indulge that mistaken view, given the educa-
tional purpose of diversity.
Groups might be identified by their shared history of racial discrimina-
tion; for example, Native Americans are not all alike, but they were all
treated as Native Americans by the national government and by white soci-
ety. Although possibly a more refined diversity justification, especially for a
law school, such a rationale does not save Bakke. First, there is no reason to
believe that Justice Powell was an early critical race theorist who wanted to
71 Id. at 324 (noting that when choosing between A, the child of a black doctor, and
B, an inner city black child, "[i]f a good number of black students much like A but few
like B had already been admitted, the Committee might prefer B, and vice versa"). In
that instance, Harvard is differentiating between African-Americans, not taking non-
racial diversity characteristics into account. That is, in making the choice, Harvard asks
how many black doctors' children had been admitted, not how many doctors' children
in total.
72 See, e.g., Howard Goldberg, Bigotry Crosses Several Racial and Religious Lines,
Poll Shows, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Mar. 3, 1994, at 5 (citing poll which
shows "a yawning gulf between white and minority group perceptions about America").
73 497 U.S. 547, 569-84 (1990), overruled in part by Adarand Constructors v. Pena,
115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
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expose truths about subordination. This rationale cannot be what motivated
Powell, and thus is not a plausible interpretation of Bakke.74 Moreover,
such a rationale does not identify the groups to be helped. Narrowing iden-
tification of groups down to racial minorities simplifies matters, but it does
not explain whether goals should be set for all non-whites by racial group,
by historical similarity, by national origin, or by some other factor. For
example, if many Mexican-American but few Puerto Rican applicants have
been admitted to a law school class, should the school offer a preference to
Puerto Rican applicants on the ground that their group's history of subordi-
nation was different, or deny a preference, on the ground that there are
already plenty of Latinos and Latinas in the class? If a school has already
admitted many Puerto Ricans, should a school offer a preference to a Filipi-
no-American because the Filipino is Asian, or deny it, on the ground that
the school already has plenty of people whose ancestors had been forcefully
colonized by the United States as a result of the Spanish-American War? A
shared history of subordination does. not divide non-whites into tidy catego-
ries.
Another improbable explanation for the quandaries that Bakke leaves
unresolved is that Bakke can be based on what might be called an anti-di-
versity rationale, exemplified by Justice Stevens's dissenting opinion in
Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education.75 Stevens argued that affirmative
action for teachers might be justified for the pedagogical purpose of show-
ing' "that the diverse -ethnic, cultural, and national backgrounds that have
been brought together in our famous 'melting pot' do not identify essential
differences among the human beings that inhabit our land .... [C]olor, like
beauty, is only 'skin deep .. ,,,76 This rationale might justify organization
of affirmative action on purely racial grounds, but it cannot be what Powell
meant. Powell insisted that inclusion of non-white groups added something
different to a school. That does not make sense if Powell thought all races
were not "essentially different."77
4 Justice Powell wrote, for example, that an applicant "with a particular back-
ground-whether it be ethnic, geographic, culturally advantaged or disadvantaged-may
bring to a professional school ... experiences, outlooks, and ideas that enrich the train-
ing of its student body." Bakke, 438 U.S. at 314.
75 476 U.S. 267, 313-20 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
76 Id. at 315 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
7 It also seems difficult to justify admissions preferences on the Stevens ground. If
there are measurable differences in indicators of future performance among minority
applicants, an admissions preference would seem to undermine the goal of demonstrat-
ing to white students that whites and minorities are essentially the same.
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III. THE REJECTION OF BAKKEAN DIVERSITY
Even if Bakke is not completely satisfying from an intellectual stand-
point, it nevertheless permits race-based affirmative action programs. Fol-
lowing Bakke's formal limitations, a school can offer admissions preferences
to members of non-white races. If Justice Powell does not have to explain in
more detail just what, exactly, diversity is or how it is achieved, a school
applying Bakke should not either.78
Unfortunately, the affirmative action programs that have been imple-
mented by schools show that many of them are not motivated by any form
of diversity per se. Rather, many programs explicitly acknowledge that other
ends also motivate their preferences. Some programs that purport to promote
diversity are racially selective, offering benefits only to some races, which
seems counter to the end of diversity. Not every admissions program has
these features, but enough of them do to suggest that, for many schools,
Bakkean diversity is not the driving force behind their affirmative action
programs.
A. Explicit Denial of a Diversifying Purpose--ABA Accreditation Standard
212 and Its Progeny
Kent Greenawalt wrote that Bakke's "diversity" rationale was a fig leaf
covering up a different goal:
I have yet to find a professional academic who believes the
primary motivation for preferential admissions has been to
promote diversity in the student body for the better education
of all the students while they are in professional school.
Diversity is undoubtedly one reason for such programs, but
the justification of countering the effects of societal discrimi-
nation relied on by Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and
Blackmun comes closer to stating their central purpose, and
Justice Powell offers no convincing reason for rejecting that
justification and accepting the diversity argument.79
7 For a detailed history of the development of one law school's special admissions
policies, see Albert Y. Muratsuchi, Race, Class, and UCLA School of Law Admissions,
1967-1994, 16 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 90 (1995).
" Kent Greenawalt, The Unresolved Problems of Reverse Discrimination, 67 CAL.
L. REV. 87, 122 (1979). Similarly, Leslie Pickering Francis recently wrote a defense of
affirmative action in higher education, exploring compensatory, corrective, and
redistributive rationales. Although Professor Francis never said she was against diversi-
ty for its own sake, her failure to discuss it suggests that she did not regard it as one of
the more persuasive rationales for affirmative action. See Leslie Pickering Francis, In
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In the context of law school affirmative action, there is strong evidence
that Professor Greenawalt is correct; the primary purpose for many pro-
grams seems to be something other than diversity. The foundational law
school affirmative action policy was established by Standard 212 of the
American Bar Association Standards for the Accreditation of Law
Schools."° Standard 212 requires all law schools to have affirmative action
policies for "qualified members of groups (notably racial and ethnic minor-
ities) which have been victims of discrimination in various forms."'" Be-
cause failure to maintain accreditation renders a law school's graduates
ineligible to sit for most state bar examinations, law schools have little
choice but to comply with this requirement.
8 2
Standard 212 is not identical to Bakkean diversity. Instead, its explicit
concern is addressing historical discrimination, not pedagogical enrich-
ment. 3 Indeed, an entirely separate ABA rule "supports the use of admis-
Defense of Affirmative Action, in AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND THE UNIVERSITY: A
PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY 25-32 (Steven Cahn ed., 1993).
80 APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS: AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION STANDARDS AND
RULES OF PROCEDURE § 212 (1980).
81 The rule provides in full:
Consistent with sound educational policy and the Standards, the law school shall
demonstrate, or have carried out and maintained, by concrete action, a commit-
ment to providing full opportunities for the study of law and entry into the profes-
sion by qualified members of groups (notably racial and ethnic minorities) which
have been the victims of discrimination in various forms. This commitment would
typically include a special concern for determining the potential of such applicants
through the admission process, special recruitment efforts, and a program which
assists in meeting the unusual financial needs of many such students, provided
that no school is obligated to apply standards for the award of financial assistance
different from those applied to other students.
Id.
82 Indeed, the Massachusetts School of Law at Andover was denied accreditation in
part because of its failure to comply with Standard 212. Massachusetts Sch. of Law at
Andover, Inc. v. ABA, 857 F. Supp. 455, 457 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
" The "legislative history" of Standard 212 helps to clarify that it is intended in im-
portant part to increase the number of disadvantaged minorities, rather than simply to
improve the educational experience for all students. The August 1980 recommendation
of the ABA Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar in support of adop-
tion of Standard 212, for example, demonstrates that the standard was intended to
achieve social change as well as educational improvement. Diversity, the recommenda-
tion argued, "is important both to a meaningful legal education and to meet the needs of
a pluralistic society and profession." ABA Section of Legal Education and Admissions
to the Bar, Recommendation on Standard 212, at 3, in ABA REPORTS WITH RECOM-
MENDATIONS TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES, 1980 ANNUAL MEETING (Aug. 5-6, 1980).
"The Task Force concluded that the Proposed Standard is necessary to ensure that dis-
advantaged members of minority groups will not be excluded from law schools and the
profession, but will have the opportunity, as law students and lawyers, to participate in
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
sions standards.., which promote diversity in law schools."' To the ex-
tent that Standard 212 is treated as purely aspirational, or is implemented in
a way that does not result in admission of students who otherwise would
have been rejected, it may be unproblematic. If, however, a school imple-
ments policies that result in the admission of applicants who would other-
wise have been rejected, compliance with Standard 21i likely would be
illegal for any school that was not acting to overcome its own history of
discrimination.' Other quasi-official sources are similar to Standard 212.'
Davis v. Halpern,87 a federal civil rights action from the Eastern Dis-
trict of New York, supports this conclusion. Davis may be the most impor-
tant interpretation of Bakke in the context of law school affirmative action,
but it has been widely ignored. In Davis, the plaintiff, a disappointed appli-
cant to the City University of New York Law School at Queens College
(CUNY), challenged the school's affirmative action program.' CUNY's
admission policy essentially paraphrased Standard 212. The school ex-
plained:
and contribute to this country's development." Id. at 4. The Standard was intended to
support "programs at law schools having as their purpose the admission to law school
and ultimately to the legal profession of greater numbers of interested but disadvantaged
members of minority groups who are capable of successful completion of law school."
Id. at 3 (internal quotations omitted).
84 ABA COUNCIL OF THE SECTION OF LEGAL EDUCATION AND ADMISSIONS TO THE
BAR Policy 14 (1981).
85 The argument could be made that Standard 212 is saved from illegality because it
does not require any particular forms of affirmative action; that is, it does not require,
for example, the kind of admissions program that Bakke held unconstitutional. More-
over, although the kinds of programs that Standard 212 appears to require ("special
concern for determining the potential of such applicants through the admissions process
[and] special recruitment efforts") seem highly subject to being implemented in unlaw-
ful ways (especially in light of the programs that actually exist), possible illegality in
form could be avoided. Thus, my conclusion that Standard 212 is illegal rests on a
belief that a racial classification must be founded on a compelling interest, even if the
means used are wholly unobjectionable. If the goal of Standard 212 is to increase the
representation of historically disadvantaged minorities, and law schools take action
based on the Standard, it appears that the law, as laid down in Bakke, has been violated.
s6 See, e.g., LAW SCHOOL ADMISSION COUNCIL, THE OFFICIAL GUIDE TO U.S. LAW
SCHOOLS 10 (1995) [hereinafter GUIDE TO U.S. LAW SCHOOLS] ("Almost all law
schools have active recruitment programs for students who are members of minority
groups to help insure greater minority representation in the legal profession. Law
schools strongly encourage minority applicants.").
87 768 F. Supp. 968 (E.D.N.Y. 1991).
88 Id. at 972. The suit was settled when the school agreed to admit Mr. Davis and
pay damages and attorneys fees. Today's News: Update, N.Y. L.J., June 30, 1992, at 1.
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Because minorities and other groups are underrepresented in
the legal profession and because of the diverse composition
of New York City and State and the Law School's commit-
ment to diversity in its student body, membership in
underrepresented groups is one of several factors, such as
GPA and LSAT scores, which Committee members may
consider, in determining an applicant's request for admis-
sion. 9
Another portion of the affirmative action policy stated that the law school's
admission policy was intended to "help create a bar that is more diversified,
and more representative of the full range of peoples that make up New York
City and the United States."9
Judge Glasser noted that CUNY's policies "seem[] to confuse or merge
the goal of diversity, whose intent is to cultivate a richer academic environ-
ment, with that of the remedial consideration of race and ethnicity, which in
this case seems directed at addressing the inadequate minority representation
in the legal profession."'" For Judge Glasser, the invalidity of CUNY's pol-
icies was apparent:
If the policy expressed in these statements is a simple prefer-
ence for members of certain minorities over other individu-
als, then it is unconstitutional as "discrimination for its own
sake." If it is to combat the effect of societal discrimination
on the legal profession, then it is unconstitutional for its
failure to be limited to the goal of remedying specific prior
discriminatory practices by the law school. Neither side in
this case has proffered a shred of evidence suggesting that
the law school has ever engaged in discrimination against
those underrepresented groups. Lastly, if it is to produce
lawyers committed to serving underrepresented segments of
our population, it is unconstitutional not because the goal is
an impermissible one for the state to pursue, but because
"there are more precise and reliable ways to identify appli-
cants who are genuinely interested in the ... problems of
minorities than by race.
92
89 Davis, 768 F. Supp. at 980 (quoting affidavit of CUNY Law School's Director of
Admissions, Carlton Clark).
9 Id. at 972 (quoting the 1990-91 CUNY Law School catalog).
91 Id.
I d. at 980-81 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
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Judge Glasser may not have realized the significance of his decision, but it
is fairly momentous. Given that the criticized portion of the CUNY policy
was essentially the same as that of Standard 212, Davis suggests that Stan-
dard 212 is illegal. There seems little question that Judge Glasser has cor-
rectly interpreted Bakke, and that the aspects of Bakke he relied on remain
sound law.93
Standard 212 was adopted in 1980, two years after Bakke was decid-
ed.94 Several years later, the ABA had an opportunity to rethink the validi-
ty of the policy when it adopted a regulation requiring all schools to imple-
ment written policies for the execution of Standard 212 as a condition of
accreditation.95 Yet Standard 212 seems to invite affirmative action pro-
grams to achieve goals that were proscribed by Bakke, ignoring the con-
straints set down by the Court, and without explaining why they are inappli-
cable. Given that the policy was vetted by lawyers, law school professors,
and deans who were quite capable of reading and understanding Bakke, this
omission is very difficult to explain or understand.96
Dean Brest and Ms. Oshige also suggest that remedying past discrimina-
tion is a sound basis for an affirmative action program, insisting that an
affirmative action program can have the goal of increasing minority
underrepresentation.97 Accordingly, "[a]n affirmative action program seeks
to remedy the significant underrepresentation of members of certain racial,
ethnic, or other groups through measures that take group membership or
identity into account."" Brest and Oshige also deny that educational en-
hancement is the only legitimate goal for affirmative action, arguing:
There are two broad sets of rationales for an affirmative
action program for law school admission or hiring. First, a
racially and ethnically diverse student body and faculty can
See supra notes 18-26 and accompanying text.
94 ABA, APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS: AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION STANDARDS
AND RULES OF PROCEDURE at ix (1983).
95 ABA COUNCIL OF THE SECTION OF LEGAL EDUCATION AND ADMISSION TO THE
BAR Policy 19 (1983).
Perhaps part of the answer arises from a phenomenon described by Judge Harry
Edwards: "[M]any law schools-especially the so-called 'elite' ones-have abandoned
their proper place, by emphasizing abstract theory at the expense of practical scholar-
ship and pedagogy .... The 'impractical' scholar ... addresses concrete issues in a
wholly theoretical manner." Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal
Education and the Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34, 34-35 (1992). It may be that
some scholars felt no greater need for slavish adherence to precedent in the operation of
their law schools, particularly if the case law was "wrong," than they did in their schol-
arship.
9 Brest & Oshige, supra note 59, at 856.
98 id.
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serve an institution's missions of teaching and scholarship.
Second, the visible presence and success of minority profes-
sionals can help secure compensatory or distributive justice
for other members of their racial and ethnic groups."
They recognize that this second goal is illegal:
[A]n institution may treat an applicant's minority status as a
'plus' in the admissions process. It may do this only for the
purpose of increasing the diversity of its student body for
educational reasons, and not to increase the number of mi-
nority graduates in society as a whole or to redress past
societal discrimination."°
Nevertheless, the authors find remedying past societal discrimination to be a
good ground for affirmative action."'
Brest and Oshige also discuss at length the corrective and distributive
justice rationales for affirmative action." 2 Although corrective justice and
distributive justice have some attractive features, they have one disadvantage
that would seem to disqualify them from implementation-namely, their
current illegality, which the authors acknowledge.0 3 Yet the authors do not
discuss those compelling features for the purpose of demonstrating why Su-
preme Court doctrine is wrong. Instead, they appear to propose that distribu-
tive or corrective models might well be implemented or continued in spite
of their unlawfulness." Their article hopes "to formulate some principles
for determining what groups should be included in affirmative action pro-
grams": 105
Our aim is not to engage in a fundamental philosophical or
legal defense or critique of affirmative action, but rather to
identify criteria for determining which groups should be
included in law school admissions or hiring programs.
99Id.
100 Id. at 857. The authors quite properly note that "a discussion of a subject of such
broad importance ought not be limited to the particular rationales favored at any one
time by a particular alliance of justices." Id. at 858.
101 Id. at 858-59.
102 Id. at 867-75.
103 Id. at 856.
104 Id. at 898-900.
105 Id. at 856.
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A law school's affirmative action program for admissions
or faculty appointments may be premised on any of three
rationales: (1) the educational benefits of a diverse student
body and faculty; (2) corrective justice, or compensation for
discrimination against the members of a group; or (3) distrib-
utive justice, designed to ensure that no group is significantly
and intractably disadvantaged.1"
Surprisingly, the article suggests that one might want to engage in con-
duct that the authors admit is unlawful, giving little attention to the question
of whether a school should do so. Yet, the form of affirmative action advo-
cated by Brest and Oshige is common. Many law schools, following the
example set by Standard 212, openly state that their policies are designed to
increase the representation of underrepresented minorities, without reference
to some independent pedagogical purpose. 7 For instance, then-Dean Mark
Yudof of the University of Texas School of Law testified that at one point
the school's affirmative action program was revitalized because "[t]here was
some concern expressed ... that the representation of Mexican-Americans
and African-Americans in the student body was not adequate." ' 8 There
was no mention that the educational goals of diversity were not being satis-
fied."°
The Texas policy frankly admits that its goal is to provide a first-class
education to the future leaders of the bench and bar, and to provide mean-
ingful representation of the two largest minority groups in Texas: Mexican-
Americans and African-Americans."' Dean Yudof believed that a state law
school was obligated
to engage in affirmative action efforts to provide meaningful
representation of Mexican-Americans and African-Americans
in the legal profession ....
I think it's very important in a state that is 35 percent
Mexican-American and African-American, in my judgment,
that the legal system begin to reflect those types of numbers,
106 Id. at 859, 898-99.
107 See infra notes 118-23 and accompanying text (describing admissions policies of
the University of Southern California, Chicago, Duke, Emory, UCLA, Cornell, Michi-
gan, and Texas law schools); see also GUIDE TO U.S. LAW SCHOOLS, supra note 86, at
61 ("Many law schools give special admission consideration to members of minority
and disadvantaged groups because traditionally they have been underrepresented in the
legal profession.").
"08 20 Hopwood Transcript, supra note 36, at 22.
109 20 id.
110 20 id. at 37-38.
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that the system be treated as involving all our citizens, and
that legal education be perceived as open to all citizens."'
The motive of this policy seems to share the same defect as that of
CUNY-it is designed to address underrepresentation, not to achieve aca-
demic diversity.
B. Racial Selectivity
Some law schools' policies extend to all races."2 Rutgers Law
School "3 and Minnesota Law School,"4 for example, offer admissions
preferences to African-Americans, Asian-Americans, Native Americans, and
Latinos and Latinas' 15 Other affirmative action programs appear inconsis-
tent with Bakkean diversity because they are racially selective. The principle
of diversity would seem to preempt any question that racial selectivity could
be legitimate." 6 Seeking out fewer than all of the various racial groups is
simply incompatible with diversity, unless some races have little or no con-
tribution to make, an argument at odds with the idea that, at some level, all
races should be equally valued. Put another way, there would seem to be no
reason for a school that believed in racial diversity to seek representation of
less than all of America's racial groups. Nevertheless, selectivity is more
readily understandable if the program is motivated by ends other than diver-
sity.
Almost immediately after Bakke, it became clear that the diversity prin-
ciple would not be employed to benefit all non-white groups. Archibald
Cox, for example, who was counsel for the Board of Regents in Bakke,
perceived no problem with a program designed to achieve "admission of
some qualified black, Chicano, and Native American students in preference
to some applicants who scored better on numerical indicators and perhaps
other conventional admissions criteria,"' .7 in spite of its exclusion of
... 20 id. at 41. After making these statements, the Dean testified that another reason
for affirmative action was to achieve diversity. 20 id. at 42.
2 I was unable to find a comprehensive description of the current affirmative action
programs at all law schools. The information exists in the form of reports that all ac-
credited law schools are required to provide to the ABA, but the ABA would not make
the reports available to me.
113 Rutgers offers special admissions to "Black/African Americans, Asian-Americans,
Hispanic-Americans, and Native Americans." 1994-96 VIEWBOOK OF THE RUTGERS
SCHOOL OF LAW-NEWARK 20.
14 18 Hopwood Transcript, supra note 36, at 35.
115 1 believe that these policies are intended to cover all non-Caucasian people, even
if some would not fit neatly into these categories.
16 See supra part II.D.
117 Archibald Cox, Minority Admissions After Bakke, in BAKKE, WEBER, AND AFFIR-
1996] 909
910 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 4:3
Asian-Americans. Following this approach, affirmative action programs at
some schools are restricted. One group of schools focuses on African-Amer-
icans only."'
Other law schools, while encouraging applications from members of
other races in addition to African-Americans, fail to offer special consider-
ation to all non-whites. Stanford "especially encourages applications from
African Americans, Mexican Americans, American Indians, and Puerto
Ricans, as well as others whose ethnic and social background provide addi-
tional dimensions that will enhance the school's programs."".9 Thus, Stan-
ford does not give a preference to Latinos and Latinas of other than Mexi-
can or Puerto Rican descent, nor does it grant a preference to Asian-Ameri-
cans.
Some schools encourage admission of "underrepresented" minorities. 2 '
MATIVE ACTION 80-104 (Rockefeller Foundation ed. 1978).
11 For example, the University of Virginia School of Law candidly states that "[t]he
primary focus of minority recruitment at the University of Virginia is on black appli-
cants." GUIDE TO U.S. LAW SCHOOLS, supra note 86, at 383. Nevertheless, "[m]embers
of other minority groups are given special attention by the Admissions Committee." Id.
The University of Arkansas School of Law-Fayetteville, which counts non-numerical
criteria of any kind only for Arkansans, states that "Black applicants who are Arkansas
residents should contact the Admissions Office concerning a minority admissions pro-
gram." Id. at 74. Similarly, the University of Memphis-Cecil B. Humphreys School of
Law has a summer program designed "to increase the number of blacks admitted to law
school in Tennessee." Id. at 226.
I d. at 342-43.
Dean Kay of Boalt Hall recently explained that affirmative action programs were
necessary not just to improve her school's academic program, but because "'[t]he need
to diversify the legal profession is not a vague liberal ideal; it is an essential component
of the administration of justice."' See Arleen Jacobius, Affirmative Action on Way Out
In Calif, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1995, at 22, 23. Bulletins of many law schools indicate that
remedying underrepresentation of minority groups in the legal profession is an indepen-
dent aim of their programs. See, e.g., THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO, 1996 APPLICATION
MATERIALS: THE LAW SCHOOL 17 ("We are particularly interested in receiving applica-
tions from women and minority students, two groups traditionally underrepresented in
the law."); Admission and Registration, EMORY UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW: CATA-
LOG 1994-1996, Aug. 1995, at 57 (observing that school seeks qualified minority appli-
cants because "minority groups are sorely underrepresented in the legal profession");
The Admission Process, UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW CENTER BULLE-
TIN, Aug. 14, 1995, at 78 ("An applicant will be regarded as potentially contributing to
student diversity if his or her background or experience would not ordinarily be well
represented in the student body or the profession."); Admissions Standards, 1995-96:
The School of Law, BULLETIN OF DUKE UNIVERSITY, Sept. 1995, at 39 (noting that
affirmative action plan takes "special care ... in evaluating applications from members
of minority groups whose members have not been well-represented in the legal profes-
sion"); Admission to the School, UCLA: SCHOOL OF LAW 1995-1996 BULLETIN AND
APPLICATION, Aug. 31, 1995, at 75 ("The University's President has made clear...
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The application materials for Cornell graduate programs, including advanced
law degrees at Cornell Law School, state that "[t]he Graduate School active-
ly encourages applicants from minority groups that are underrepresented in
United States Higher Education and the professions: African Americans,
American Indians/Alaskan Natives, Mexican Americans and Puerto Ri-
cans."'' Again, Asian-Americans and other Latinos and Latinas are not
"actively encouraged" by the program.
Similarly, Michigan Law School's policy states:
In addition to its own interest in forming a class which is
strengthened by the talents and diversity of its members,
Michigan recognizes the public interest in increasing the
numbers of lawyers from groups which the faculty identifies
as significantly underrepresented in the legal profession. In
particular, we strongly encourage prospective students who
are African American, Mexican American, Native American,
or Puerto Rican and raised on the U.S. mainland to ap-
ply.
22
Michigan's goal of increasing minority representation is explicitly decoupled
from diversity per se, and, accordingly, Asian-American, Puerto Ricans
raised in Puerto Rico, and other non-Mexican, non-Puerto Rican Latinos and
Latinas are not offered a special preference. The University of Texas Law
School's program also extends benefits only to African-Americans and Mex-
ican-Americans. 23
[that] 'We are committed to diversity as both a powerful tool in educating our stu-
dents ... , and as an essential way of meeting our responsibility to prepare future lead-
ers for California's diverse society."').
121 CORNELL UNIVERSITY: THE GRADUATE SCHOOL APPLICATION 1996-97, at 6.
"2 The J.D. Program: Admissions Requirements and Procedures, UNIVERSITY OF
MICHIGAN BULLETIN, July 12, 1995, at 81; see also UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN-MAD-
ISON, LAW AT WISCONSIN 11 ("The Law School has established a program for giving
special admission consideration to applicants from minority groups historically disad-
vantaged in the United States, underrepresented in law schools and the legal profession,
and with cultural backgrounds sufficiently distinguishable that our diversity goals will
be significantly enhanced. It is clear that such groups include Black Americans, Ameri-
can Indians, Puerto Ricans, and Chicanos. Applicants from other minorities, or from the
white majority, who claim to be similarly situated, have their cases considered on an
individual basis.").
"2 21 Hopwood Transcript, supra note 36, at 5-7. Texas may be in a different posi-
tion than other schools because of its history of racial discrimination against African-
Americans. See Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950) (holding that educational oppor-
tunities for the study of law offered to white and African-American students by the
state of Texas were not substantially equal and therefore violated the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
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C. Does Bakke Permit a School to Create a Class of Non-Diversifying
Races?
As a doctrinal matter, racially selective affirmative action programs
appear impermissible under Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke. A classifica-
tion of minority races into "diversifying" races and "nondiversifying" races
would probably not pass constitutional muster, because racial selectivity is
contrary to the end of diversity and is subject to manipulation. If race per se
is diversifying, it seems almost indisputable that a school obtains a more
diverse student body if it encourages the admission and attendance of Afri-
can-Americans and Asian-Americans and Latinos and Latinas and Native
Americans, rather than encouraging only one or some of those groups.
Justice Powell's analysis seems to foreclose racial selectivity. Although
Powell identified diversity as a compelling interest, he found the program
defective as implemented because it was underinclusive in that it focused
exclusively on race." To this extent, U.C. Davis's program was not a "di-
versity" program of the kind that could be justified by a compelling interest:
its "special admissions program, focused solely on ethnic diversity, would
hinder rather than further attainment of genuine diversity."' 5 Notably, this
was a legal conclusion, not a factual finding. Justice Powell did not use the
narrow focus of the program as a basis for a conclusion that U.C. Davis was
not sincerely interested in diversity. Instead, even assuming the school's
good faith, it had no discretion to have a program that was limited in this
way.
It is also important to contrast this approach to traditional equal protec-
tion analysis regarding classifications not affecting fundamental rights or
disadvantaging racial minorities. The accepted rule is that "[l]egislatures
may implement their program step by step in ... economic areas, adopting
regulations that only partially ameliorate a perceived evil and deferring
complete elimination of the evil to future regulations.""12 Justice Powell
refused to apply this principle to the Bakke situation, even though the people
harmed were not deprived of a fundamental right 7 and were not racial
minorities-they were, for example, writers, New Englanders,. carpenters,
and others who might have made a contribution to the non-racial aspects of
diversity that were not considered in the Davis program. Powell appeared to
' Board of Regents v. Bakke, 428 U.S. 265, 315 (1978).
125 Id. (emphasis in original).
126 City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (citing Williamson v.
Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 488-89 (1955)) (additional citation omitted).
127 See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 37-38 (1973) (hold-
ing that education is not a fundamental right).
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believe that partial, step-by-step diversity is not diversity-it is something
else.
A racially selective program shares the defect of the U.C. Davis pro-
gram. A system designed to ensure the presence of one or only some minor-
ity races does not seek the all-encompassing diversity Justice Powell held
was necessary to justify a racial preference. If, under Bakke, a school is not
free to take a first step towards diversity by beginning with race, it is hard
to see how a program that was even narrower in scope could survive. Thus,
in Podberesky v. Kirwan,"2 the Fourth Circuit expressed doubt that a
scholarship program reserved only for blacks could be a legitimate diversity
program under Bakke: "ethnic diversity does not appear to be the real inter-
est behind the program.' 29
Post-Brown equal protection jurisprudence has been inhospitable to race-
by-race solutions to social problems. Before Bakke, some legal scholars
supported faculty discretion to exclude particular races (really, Asian-Ameri-
cans) from affirmative action programs. Robert M. O'Neil, later President of
the University of Virginia, wrote:
As a constitutional matter, it does not seem necessary that all
minority groups be aided equally. Unless some minority
groups are actually disadvantaged while others are preferred,
or the basis for distinguishing between groups is wholly
irrational, a college or university might well make a major
commitment to one or two groups rather than to all. The
equal protection clause does not preclude partial solutions to
complex problems in this or other areas. Thus if the Univer-
sity of Washington determined that Asian applicants were
less in need of preferential consideration than other minori-
ties, that would appear to be a constitutionally permissible
choice."3
Kent Greenawalt, likewise, argued that racial selectivity should be permitted
upon a school's demonstration of "some reasonable basis" for their choic-
128 956 F.2d 52 (4th Cir. 1992).
129 Id. at 56 n.4.
130 Robert M. O'Neil, Racial Preference and Higher Education: The Larger Context,
60 VA. L. REV. 925, 942 (1974) (citing, inter alia, Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S.
641 (1966)) (footnotes omitted).
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es.' "Reasonable basis" and "wholly irrational" are standards normally
applied to equal protection review of economic regulation.'
In fact, the Court had long before rejected the idea that governments
could solve problems one step at a time by drawing lines in the area of race.
In McLaughlin v. Florida,'33 the Court unanimously struck down a Florida
statute making it criminal for a white person to habitually reside with a
black person of the opposite sex unless the couple were married." The
Court rejected an argument that this statute was a legitimate partial solution
to a complex problem.
Normally, the widest discretion is allowed the legislative
judgment in determining whether to attack some, rather than
all, of the manifestations of the evil aimed at; and normally
that judgment is given the benefit of every conceivable cir-
cumstance which might suffice to characterize the classifica-
tion as reasonable rather than arbitrary and invidious. But we
deal here with a classification based upon the race of the
participants, which must be viewed in light of the historical
fact that the central purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment
was to eliminate racial discrimination emanating from offi-
cial sources in the States.'35
Accordingly, the Court concluded: "That a general evil will be partially
corrected may at times, and without more, serve to justify the limited appli-
cation of a criminal law; but legislative discretion to employ the piecemeal
approach stops short of permitting a State to narrow statutory coverage to
focus on a racial group." '136
O'Neil's and Greenawalt's argument that a race-by-race distribution of
benefits was permissible 3 ' was based on Katzenbach v. Morgan,"
13, Greenawalt, supra note 53, at 598-99 (relying in part on Katzenbach and appar-
ently supporting discretion of the University of Washington Law School to exclude
Japanese-American and Chinese-American applicants from its affirmative action pro-
gram).
132 See, e.g., Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 230, 235 (1981) (holding that stat-
ute must "classify the persons it affects in a manner rationally related to legitimate
governmental objectives"); Gulf Colo. & Santa Fe Ry. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 165-66
(1879) (holding that for a classification to be valid, "it must appear [that it] is one
based upon some reasonable ground-some difference which bears a just and proper
relation to the attempted classification-and is not a mere arbitrary selection").
1 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
134 Id. at 187.
.3- Id. at 191-92 (citations omitted).
136 Id. at 194; see also Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1967) (rejecting applica-
tion of the piecemeal approach in a case involving racial classification).
137 See supra notes 130-31 and accompanying text.
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which held that a benefit, even involving a fundamental right such as the
franchise, could be distributed under the piecemeal approach.'39 Thus, the
Court upheld a portion of the Voting Rights Act 4' that exempted from
state English literacy requirements persons educated in schools within Amer-
ican jurisdictions and whose instruction was not in English. 4' Critically,
Katzenbach did not involve a racial classification.' In later cases involv-
ing distribution of benefits based on racial classifications, the Supreme
Court followed McLaughlin, not Katzenbach'43  Thus, although
Katzenbach has been cited for the proposition that economic regulation may
proceed in a piecemeal fashion,'44 it cannot begin to bear the weight that
Greenawalt and O'Neil place on it.
In any event, it would strike the modern ear as odd if instead of making
a provision for "all persons," for example, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 provided that
"All Hispanic-Americans, within the jurisdiction of the United States shall
have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce con-
tracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of
all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is en-
joyed by white citizens.' 45 At least from the perspective of those racial
minorities left unprotected by this kind of statute, such laws might seem to
lose their character as anti-discrimination provisions. That the particular
group is protected is not a bad thing, but the unfairness of omitting others
would make it seem arbitrary.
The possibility of stigma suggests that a selective program would be
unconstitutional even under the less restrictive position taken by Justice
Brennan's opinion in Bakke. Justice Brennan and three other Justices would
have upheld the aspects of the program that Powell found objectionable,
applying an intermediate level of scrutiny because the affirmative action
138 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
139 Id. at 657-58.
42 U.S.C. § 1973b(e) (1994).
141 Katzenbach, 384 U.S. at 646-47.
142 See Edward D. Rogers, When Logic and Reality Collide: The Supreme Court and
Minority Business Set-Asides, 24 CoLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 117, 137-38 (1990) (not-
ing that Katzenbach did not involve a racial classification and thus could not directly
justify affirmative action).
143 See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 500-01 (1989).
That Croson relied on McLaughlin suggests McLaughlin established a general principle,
not one that was applicable only because the challenged law involved imposed a crimi-
nal sanction. In addition, the contrary rule would be problematic; it is difficult to be-
lieve that the result in Katzenbach would have been the same if the statute had exempt-
ed a particular race from state literacy requirements.
14 See, e.g., City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976).
145 Compare 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994).
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plan burdened whites. 46 They contended that a higher level of scrutiny
was inappropriate because
whites as a class [do not] have any of the "traditional indicia
of suspectness: the class is not saddled with such disabilities,
or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treat-
ment, or relegated to such a position of political
powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from
the majoritarian political process."' 47
The Brennan group, then, should have a different response to a chal-
lenge to a racially selective diversity program than it did to the features of
the racially inclusive program challenged in Bakke. Of course, the people
excluded by racially selective diversity programs are not whites; they are
members of historically disfavored minority groups.'48 Moreover, racially
selective programs may communicate the message that the institution en-
courages the admission of some races because the presence of those races
adds qualities and benefits to the institution that otherwise would not be ob-
tained, but that other races will not be recruited because they do not contrib-
ute those special advantages. A policy justified on the basis of diversity but
excluding some groups may unavoidably stigmatize the non-preferred
groups. Such a policy would "contravene the cardinal principle that racial
classifications that stigmatize-because they are drawn on the presumption
that one race is inferior to another or because they put the weight of govern-
ment behind racial hatred and separatism-are invalid without more."' 49
Justice Brennan might have contemplated leaving inclusion decisions to
politics, providing little judicial review. According to Brennan, if German-
Americans had challenged the U.C. Davis program on the ground that Ger-
man-Americans also had suffered discrimination, "they would have no con-
stitutional claim unless they could prove that Davis intended invidiously to
discriminate against German-Americans."' 50 If this showing were not
made, "the only question [would be] whether it was rational for Davis to
conclude that the groups it preferred had a greater claim to compensation
146 Board of Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 361-62, 369 (1978) (Brennan, J., con-
curring in judgment in part and dissenting in part).
141 Id. at 357 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part)
(quoting San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973)).
141 Whites may have to give up spaces for the existence of the diversity program, but
excluded minority groups also are burdened by not being included in the program even
though similarly situated.
149 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 357-58 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment in part and dis-
senting in part).
150 Id. at 359 n.35 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in
part).
916 [Vol. 4:3
1996] THE CRISIS OF BAKKEAN DIVERSITY 917
than the groups it excluded. Thus, claims of rival groups, although they may
create thorny political problems, create relatively simple problems for the
courts.)151
The meaning of this passage probably turns on the race of the group
making the claim in the hypothetical, and the fact that the U.C. Davis pro-
gram actually included all minority races, including Latinos and Latinas.'52
It is difficult to imagine that Brennan intended to leave racial minorities
exclusively to the tender mercies of the political process in the absence of a
showing of intentional discrimination. A school might, for political reasons,
choose not to help a relatively powerless racial minority, in favor of helping
more numerous and powerful minorities.153 It seems unfair that groups
"' Id. at 359-60 n.35 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in
part) (citation omitted).
152 In Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980), in a judgment in which Justice
Brennan concurred, the Court engaged in a similar analysis of a program that was simi-
larly inclusive of non-white groups. The Court rejected a claim that limiting the pro-
gram to "citizens of the United States who are Negroes, Spanish-speaking, Orientals,
Indians, Eskimos, and Aleuts," id. at 454, rendered it underinclusive; id. at 485. The
Court explained: "We are not reviewing a federal program that seeks to confer a pre-
ferred status upon a nondisadvantaged minority or to give special assistance to only one
of several groups established to be similarly disadvantaged minorities. Even in such a
setting, the Congress is not without a certain authority." Id. The Court's language prob-
ably should be read in light of the fact that the program included all or virtually all
non-white groups in the United States. Moreover, none of the cases cited by the Court
in support of its decision involved racial classifications. Personnel Administrator v.
Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979), involved a veteran's preference that was offered to both
genders and all races, and Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977), presented a Social
Security preference that applied to all women and was denied to all men. Morton v.
Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974), involved a preference for hiring Native Americans at the
Bureau of Indian Affairs. Morton comes closest to permitting selective programs, but no
other racial or ethnic group has the same special constitutional status possessed by Na-
tive Americans.
1 Cf. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 516 n.9 (1989) (Stevens,
J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (noting possibility that a minority set-
aside program "might be nothing more than a form of patronage").
Peightal v. Metropolitan Dade County, 940 F.2d 1394 (11th Cir. 1991), cert. de-
nied, 502 U.S. 1073 (1992), is one of a handful of court of appeals decisions dealing
with racial selectivity in an affirmative action program. In that case, the late Judge John
R. Brown, writing only for himself, argued that exclusion of races from a remedial
program should be upheld so long as there is a rational basis. Id. at 1409. Such a ratio-
nal basis existed because "[in Dade County, the two most prevalent minority groups
are blacks and Hispanics." Id. This seems an unfortunate formulation, because it invites
racial politics, and seems to award a remedy based on a ground that is not linked to the
nature of the injury. On appeal after remand, the panel offered a more satisfying justifi-
cation: the limitation was acceptable because there was no evidence of discrimination
against other groups. Peightal v. Metropolitan Dade County, 26 F.3d 1545, 1561 (11th
Cir. 1994).
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with comparable histories of harm should be treated differently on that ba-
sis. Because these kinds of remedies are possible in a variety of settings,
groups that are already powerful and numerous in various parts of the coun-
try will be at a significant advantage which will grow over time.
D. Other Compelling Reasons for Racial Selectivity
The doctrinal analysis above might be forced to yield in the face of
some overriding reason or factual circumstance that made racial selectivity
essential for the achievement of diversity. Nevertheless, I have been unable
to identify such a reason.
1. Expanding Diversity Would Squeeze Out Currently Preferred Groups/Some
Groups Do Not Need It
Expanding programs to include all non-white races should not result in
squeezing out African-Americans and other currently advantaged groups.
Nor would it result in awarding preferences to racial groups that are already
represented at the level the school believes necessary to achieve diversity.
Law schools clearly have the power and ability to consider an applicant's
race in such a way as to promote net racial diversity, ensuring a mix of
races in the admitted class. They would not be required to simply admit the
most "qualified" minorities without taking into account the resulting demo-
graphic makeup. That is, if twenty-five Latinos and Latinas and eleven Afri-
can-Americans had already been admitted to the class, the racial "plus"
given to the twelfth African-American might be more weighty than that
awarded to the twenty-sixth Latino or Latina.'54 If the school believes that
diversity can be achieved with seven per cent representation, and a particu-
lar minority group is admitted at that level or higher without admissions
preferences, then that group would be included in the program only to the
extent that the school counted heads to make sure the diversity level was
maintained. If diversity can be achieved without preferences, a school would
not need to award preferences.
Currently advantaged minorities might be harmed in another sense. Add-
ing new groups to the diversity list will almost inevitably have one of three
results: more whites will be rejected, some of the currently advantaged mi-
norities will be denied, or both. If the program works in accordance with the
diversity principle, then more whites will be rejected.
"" See Kenneth L. Karst & Harold W. Horowitz, The Bakke Opinions and Equal
Protection Doctrine, 14 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 7, 18-19 (1979) (noting that "if a
substantial number of Asian-Americans has already been admitted to an entering class,
then the next Asian-American to be considered will not get much of a 'plus' on diversi-
ty grounds").
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Bakke, explains Professor Blasi, "requires that admissions programs treat
minority-race applicants as persons who have something valuable to contrib-
ute to the educational environment." '55 Diversity is, in this sense, the rec-
ognition of a heretofore ignored qualification. Moreover, it is a qualification
with no apparent inherent limitation. The most diverse possible class would
be one with equal representation of every relevant group. Until that is
achieved, admission of additional members of any group, other than the
largest, contributes to diversity at that institution. 156 Thus, the result of in-
creasing the number of races eligible to contribute their perspectives to a
law school would be the same as if, say, a law school ended a policy of
automatically denying admittance to graduates of non-Ivy League colleges,
no matter how brilliant and accomplished. Some of those who would have
been admitted under the former system will be rejected, but the resulting
class will more accurately reflect the qualities that the school now considers
important.
The problem is that there may be political constraints against policies
that reduce the number of white students below a certain point. 157 If a
class contains fewer whites but is better qualified, according to proponents
of diversity, because it is more diverse, the only apparent ground for objec-
tion is that whites have some claim of right to a larger proportion of the
places in the law school. Nevertheless, a pragmatist might say that in prac-
tice there is an upper limit to a diversity admissions program. A given
school might determine that it cannot reduce the number of white students
any further than they have already. Therefore, any increase in the number of
minority groups considered in the diversity program will have to be at the
expense of the minorities in the currently favored groups.
If the decision were not to expand a program, the result would be to
justify discrimination 158 against racial minorities to protect the places of
white students, a problematic concept, and one that could only be accepted
willingly by a person who did not really believe in the value of diversi-
ty. 159 If the decision is to expand the program at the expense of the cur-
155 Blasi, supra note 14, at 67.
156 This assumes that the minority admittees have the other academic and demograph-
ic qualities schools deem desirable and that the admission of a member of a particular
race will not take the place of a person who would contribute more diversity to the
class.
157 The controversy over minority admissions at Berkeley may be an example of this.
See Richard Reeves, White Politics Outdated in Browning California, SEATrLE TIMES,
May 30, 1990, at A8.
158 That is, the non-favored minorities, though similarly situated to the favored mi-
norities in that they can offer diversity to the class, are nevertheless not included in the
diversity program.
159 A school might consider diversity as a positive factor for some non-white racial
groups but not others on the ground that awarding special consideration to all non-
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rently favored minority groups, again, whites are protected at the expense of
minorities. 6'
2. More Diversity Admissions Would Help the Wrong People
A criticism of racial inclusion might be that races which do not need or
"deserve" advantage would be included in a program, or, alternatively, that
the benefits of the program would not be focused on the most disadvantaged
students and races.'6' Expanding the number of races eligible for the pro-
gram would make the problem worse. This objection, which comes from
people who think affirmative action goes too far as well as from those who
think that it does not go far enough, is answered by the Bakke opinion.
Bakke recognized the compelling interest to be the benefit the school and its
students would gain through admission of a diverse student body, not reme-
dying past discrimination or increasing the numbers of minority students per
se.'62 Given this concern, the disadvantaged nature of the individual is not
necessarily relevant.'63
If a number of disadvantaged students have already been admitted to the
class, or if the admissions committee is considering one of the first few
whites would be too costly in terms of the other relevant qualifications for admission.
Such a decision would reveal that that school did not view diversity as a qualifica-
tion-that it did not really add something to the school's program.
160 This second course, however, may increase net diversity. The diversity effect
diminishes as more members of a group are present. Thus, a class might be more di-
verse if it has 10 members of four racial groups, rather than 20 members of two racial
groups. For a discussion of the problem of racial minorities being treated less advanta-
geously than whites in an alleged affirmative action program, see Selena Dong, "Too
Many Asians": The Challenge of Fighting Discrimination Against Asian-Americans and
Preserving Affirmative Action, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1027 (1995).
161 Compare Foster, supra note 35, at 137 (arguing that Justice Powell's diversity
scheme "fails to promote equality in a society where certain differences have been con-
structed into a basis for systematic exclusion and disadvantage, and other differences
have not") with Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 530 n.12 (1980) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting) (criticizing minority set-aside program with regard to federal contracts be-
cause "the statute makes no attempt to direct the aid it provides solely toward those
minority contracting firms that arguably still suffer from the effects of past or present
discrimination").
162 As one commentator observed, "[o]ne key aspect to observe is that Justice
Powell's diversity idea is based on an interest of the institution-that is, an enterprise
interest in an enriched educational atmosphere-rather than on an interest held by the
represented minority group." Robert G. Dixon, Jr., Bakke: A Constitutional Analysis, 67
CAL. L. REV. 69, 75-76 (1979).
163 Indeed, Justice Powell rejected underrepresentation or disadvantage as compelling
interests justifying affirmative action. See Board of Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,
315 (1978); see also supra notes 18-24 and accompanying text.
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spots, a privileged student might be as "diversifying" to the class or more so
than a disadvantaged one. The Harvard Plan praised by Justice Powell gives
the following example:
The Admissions Committee, with only a few places left to
fill, might find itself forced to choose between A, the child
of a successful black physician in an academic community
with promise of superior academic performance, and B, a
black who grew up in an inner-city ghetto of semi-literate
parents whose academic achievement was lower but who had
demonstrated energy and leadership as well as an apparently
abiding interest in black power. If a good number of black
students much like A but few like B had already been admit-
ted, the Committee might prefer B; and vice versa.1
Professor Sandalow makes the same point: "If preferences are justifiable
because they deal with the problems resulting from the continuing social
significance of race and ethnicity, there is nothing unjust in awarding a
preference to minority applicants who come from advantaged back-
grounds."'65 Professor Greenawalt agrees that the educational impact of
diverse races is satisfied by "rich" minorities as well as poor: "So long as
the superbly educated son of a black Senator or the recent immigrant from
Africa are identified as relevantly 'black' by whites and other blacks, then
this purpose of the preferential policy is served by admitting them."'"
3. Critical Mass
Diversity proponents often argue that a "critical mass"'167 of minority
students is necessary to ensure that the students are socially comfortable."
This may be necessary to make a diversity program work and to prevent
minorities from dropping out. Sometimes this principle is used to justify
racial selectivity. Dean Brest explained that Stanford's "Minority Admis-
sions Program" is intended "to assure a significant presence" of the pre-
ferred minority groups.69 Dean Brest believes that
'" Bakke, 438 U.S. at 324.
165 Sandalow, supra note 52, at 691-92.
1' Greenawalt, supra note 53, at 593.
167 22 Hopwood Transcript, supra note 36, at 18-19.
168 22 id.
169 22 id. at 14.
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in order for . . . the [minority] students to prosper, to feel
comfortable and to make the kind of contribution that they
make to the law school's educational mission, that there need
to be enough of them to feel that this is their place, that they
don't feel an isolated minority in the law school. 7'
Stanford Law School monitors the numbers of students in each of the
racial groups to make sure that a critical mass is achieved. 7 Thus, in a
recent year, when it appeared that there would be an insufficient number of
African-American students, a special effort was made to admit more from
the remaining applications.' The school aggregates Latino and Latina
subgroups when determining whether a "critical mass" has been
reached,' but makes no effort to determine whether there is a critical
mass of Chinese-, Japanese-, or Korean-American students.7 "The only
groups that [there] is an explicit concern about are the ones ... in the Mi-
nority Admissions Program. '
The critical mass notion can support racial selectivity on the ground that
different minority groups have different critical masses, and a sufficient
number of members of a particular racial group may be admitted without a
preference to establish a critical mass. Dean Bollinger of Michigan Law
School testified that about twenty-two to twenty-five percent of Michigan's
student body is minority; eleven to twelve percent African-American, five to
seven percent Asian-American, five to six percent Latino or Latina, and one
to two percent Native American.'76 He believes that there is a "different
critical mass for different minorities. ' 77 "[I]t has to do with the ... sense
of identification and with the ... psychological sense of what it means to
be a member of that minority community within a larger community...
;178 For African-Americans, "five percent of an entering class at this par-
ticular moment is too few African-Americans within the class, and they feel
alienated and alone. And somewhere perhaps over :10 percent, 10 percent or
more, begin to feel more comfortable .... ,17' Assuming Michigan sees
no particular need to increase its Asian-American student population, 80 it
170 22 id. at 21.
171 22 id. at 20.
172 22 id. at 21.
173 22 id. at 31-32.
174 22 id. at 33-34.
175 22 id. at 34.
176 16 id. at 21-22.
177 16 id. at 33.
178 16 id. at 33.
179 16 id. at 34.
" That is suggested by the fact that Asian-Americans are not included in the diversi-
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seems probable that the school has concluded that the "critical mass" for
Asian-Americans, and possibly Latinos and Latinas as well, is lower than
that for African-Americans.
I doubt this belief is warranted. Assuming that members of different
racial or cultural groups share certain fundamental human similarities, it
seems probable that members of any race or culture are happier when they
are not isolated-when there are many others like themselves who are mem-
bers of the institution. 81 Many groups in addition to African-Americans
experience residential and social segregation, to a greater or lesser degree,
voluntarily or involuntarily. Reservations, barrios, and Chinatowns are as
much a feature of the American landscape as African-American neighbor-
hoods. Moreover, national population does not necessarily affect the degree
of local segregation; any given neighborhood or area may be 100% Asian-
American or Native American, even though those groups constitute a tiny
proportion of the population as a whole.
Admittedly, any member of a minority group who enters the larger
society must eventually reconcile him or herself to a certain harsh reality:
most of the people they encounter will be members of races other than their
own. This is more true for members of less numerous races, and less true
for members of larger races. No matter what efforts are made, it would be
hard for the nation's institutions to have as great a representation of Native
Americans as African-Americans, because the population base of African-
Americans is so much larger. Nevertheless, these facts of life do not change
the feelings of minority people; there is no reason to believe that Native
Americans have grown accustomed to isolation, or that they like it. That it
might be impossible to have ten percent of every law school class be Native
American does not mean that Native Americans would not prefer to attend a
law school at which they were represented to that extent, or that a Native
American student would be any less distressed at being one or two percent
of a law school class than would an African-American student in the same
position. Accordingly, there seems to be little justification for not trying for
the same critical mass for all groups, recognizing that they will probably not
all be achieved. Concretely, this means that the school should not award a
"plus" to an applicant from a particular group to achieve a particular "criti-
cal mass" unless each group receives the same plus at the same level of
representation. Because this is not done, the critical mass argument appears
to be another way of seeking proportional representation.
ty affirmative action policy.
"' This is, in one sense, an empirical question, but it is made difficult or impossible
of definitive resolution in the absence of a reliable means of comparing interpersonal
levels of discomfort.
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IV. TAKING BAKKE SERIOUSLY: THE COSTS OF THE REJECTION OF THE
DIVERSITY MODEL
For two sets of reasons, the rejection of Bakke by many segments of the
legal academy is unwise. First, the failure to follow Bakke is eloquent testi-
mony that the decision has little intellectual support, and, perhaps more
importantly, it sends a signal to a conservative Supreme Court that profes-
sors cannot be trusted with this kind of discretion. To the extent that Bakke
is invoked to justify discrimination against historically disadvantaged minor-
ities that particular institutions wish to exclude from their programs, the
Supreme Court will be able to claim the moral high ground if they overrule
the decision. Yet even if Bakke is never overruled, failing to follow it im-
poses significant costs on those minorities who do not benefit from it.
A. Bye Bye Bakke?
Until recently, most law schools that chose not to comply with the limi-
tations of Bakke have found their conduct to be costless; since Bakke, there
has been little reported litigation over law school admissions.'82 Part of the
protection was structural; most people apply to several law schools, and a
decent white candidate will probably be admitted somewhere.'83 Arguably,
most applicants probably calculate that it is better to go to a second or third
choice than to spend the time and money to sue the school they most want
to attend, particularly because even if a plaintiff wins, she may regret being
known as the person who killed the school's affirmative action program.
Moreover, the class of people who do not have good second choices were
unlikely to make good plaintiffs; some law suits have been dismissed before
trial because of the white plaintiff's sub-par credentials as an applicant."M
182 See Drew S. Days, III, Minority Access to Higher Education in the Post-Bakke
Era, 55 U. COLO. L. REV. 491, 495-99 (1984) (discussing post-Bakke affirmative action
litigation and possible reasons for its lack of success).
183 In 1988-89, almost 62% of white applicants were admitted to at least one school
to which they applied. The average white candidate rejected from every law school to
which they applied had a GPA of 2.85 and an LSAT score of 28.7 on a 48 point scale.
MINORITY DATABOOK, supra note 6, at 47.
1 4 See, e.g., Doherty v. Rutgers Sch. of Law-Newark, 651 F.2d 893, 900 (3d Cir.
1981) (holding that the white plaintiff, whose GPA of 1.85 and LSAT score of 576 of a
possible 800 were below those of the minorities admitted, lacked standing to challenge
the program); McAdams v. Regents of the Univ. of Minn., 508 F. Supp. 354, 357, 359
(D. Minn. 1981) (granting defendant law school summary judgment because the plain-
tiff would not have been admitted even in the absence of the program; the program
involved 15 or 20 slots for minorities, but there were over 100 applicants in each of the
two years at issue who were rejected and had higher objective qualifications).
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Many of these protective factors are gone. In 1993, the Supreme Court
loosened the standing requirements for individuals claiming discrimination;
now an applicant can challenge the affirmative action policy of a school to
which the student had no hope of admission. 5 It may also be that more
highly qualified applicants are now somewhat less hesitant to sue. For ex-
ample, the lead plaintiff in Hopwood v. Texas 86 was an appealing can-
didate: a woman with a disabled child, she worked her way though college
and nevertheless earned a 3.8 grade point average.187 A sympathetic, capa-
ble, disadvantaged woman, she attacked affirmative action without apology.
That people like Hopwood are willing to sue reflects the substantial
change in the political environment. In late 1987, a few short months before
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,'88 a thoughtful commentator could
write that "[flor the moment, the affirmative action wars are over." '189 Sim-
ilarly, in July 1994, Daniel A. Farber wrote: "For both political and legal
reasons, significant changes in the extent of affirmative action are unlike-
ly.'' 90 Both of these predictions turned out to be wildly optimistic.
As a result of these new circumstances, the strength of Bakke as prece-
dent becomes critical. Even apart from the current Supreme Court's hostility
to affirmative action, Bakke is vulnerable as a technical matter. Just two
years after Bakke, the Supreme Court pointedly declined to approve it.'9 '
Given its four-one-four division, some commentators have questioned
whether there was even a binding opinion in the case,' 92 as has the Su-
185 See Associated Gen. Contractors v. City of Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656 (1993).
186 861 F. Supp. 551 (W.D. Tex. 1994), rev'd, Nos.94-50569 & 94-50664, 1996 WL
120235 (5th Cir. Mar. 18, 1996).
1' Id. at 564; see also Richard Bernstein, Racial Discrimination or Righting Past
Wrongs?, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 1994, at B8; David A. Savage, "Bakke H" Case Renews
Debate on Admissions, L.A. TIMES, July 30, 1995, at Al.
188 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
189 Herman Schwartz, The 1986 and 1987 Affirmative Action Cases: It's All Over but
the Shouting, 86 MICH. L. REV. 524, 524 (1987).
19 Daniel A. Farber, The Outmoded Debate Over Affirmative Action, 82 CAL. L.
REV. 893, 895 (1994).
191 Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 492 (1980) ("This opinion does not adopt,
either expressly or implicitly, the formulas of analysis articulated in such cases as
[Bakke].")
192 See, e.g., Days, supra note 182, at 492 (observing that "there was no opinion of
the Court, strictly speaking"); Dixon, supra note 162, at 72 & n.11; Charles Fried, Af-
firmative Action After City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.: A Response to the
Scholars' Statement, 99 YALE L.J. 155, 158 (1989) (referring to "Justice Powell's dic-
tum in Bakke about the permissibility of seeking diversity in certain educational set-
tings"); Michael S. Paulsen, Reverse Discrimination and Law School Faculty Hiring:
The Undiscovered Opinion, 71 TEX. L. REV. 993, 999 (1993) (noting that "[i]t is not
clear that Justice Powell's opinion was, in any meaningful sense of the term, 'the
law'--even at the time Bakke was decided"); Ralph Smith, Affirmative Action in Extre-
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preme Court itself.' There is a strong argument, however, that there was
a binding opinion; applying the rule that the narrowest ground of concur-
rence represents the holding of the Court, the Powell decision might be read
as the basis of the decision upholding race consciousness. 94
The Brennan group, however, created a vulnerability by stating that a
Harvard-style diversity plan is constitutional, "at least so long as the use of
race to achieve an integrated student body is necessitated by the lingering
effects of past discrimination."'95 Arguably, this is the narrowest ground of
decision, because the Brennan group might not have upheld a diversity pro-
gram where it was not necessary to remedy historical discrimination. If the
Brennan group's view does in fact represent the holding, Bakke has already
been completely undermined, and possibly overruled, because Croson elimi-
nates remedying past general societal discrimination as a ground for race-
based affirmative action.'96 It is possible, therefore, that the legal underpin-
ning for Bakke no longer exists.'97 The ambiguity of the precise ground of
decision puts Bakke's life in question, for when the Supreme Court has had
difficulty in identifying a specific holding, it occasionally has decided that
there was no holding.'
mis: A Preliminary Diagnosis of the Symptoms and the Causes, 26 WAYNE L. REV.
1337, 1346-47 (1980) (remarking that "none of the multiple opinions, including the
highly acclaimed 'pivotal' opinion of Justice Powell, could elicit a majority. Conse-
quently, Bakke is of little real precedential value . . . .") (citation omitted); cf. David P.
Bryden, On Race and Diversity, 6 CONST. COMMENTARY 383, 384 (1989).
"9 Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2108 (1995) (observing that
"Bakke did not produce an opinion for the Court"); see also Board of Regents v. Bakke,
438 U.S. 265, 324-25 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissent-
ing in part) (noting that "[tihe difficulty of the issue presented ... and the mature con-
sideration which each of our Brethren has brought to it have resulted in many different
opinions, no single one speaking for the Court").
194 See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text (discussing Marks v. United States,
430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) ("When a fragmented Court decides a case and no single
rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five justices, the holding of the Court
may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judg-
ments on the narrowest grounds.")).
195 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 326 n.1.
t9 City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
197 See id. at 493 (citing Bakke for the proposition that "[c]lassifications based on
race carry a danger of stigmatic harm. Unless they are strictly reserved for remedial
settings, they may in fact promote notions of racial inferiority and lead to a politics of
racial hostility."). Read absolutely, this passage could mean that Bakke is no longer
good law. See Milwaukee Co. Pavers Ass'n v. Fiedler, 922 F.2d 419, 422 (7th Cir.)
("The whole point of Croson is that disadvantage, diversity or other grounds for favor-
ing minorities will not justify governmental discrimination . . . "), cert. denied, 500
U.S. 954 (1991).
'9s See, e.g., Nichols v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1921 (1994), overruling Baldasar v.
Illinois, 446 U.S. 222 (1980). In Nichols, the Court stated:
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Nevertheless, Bakke's technical infirmities, by themselves, might well
not be enough to convince five Justices to overrule it. Croson did not spe-
cifically overrule Bakke, and even the present Court might not do so. Al-
though Justice Stevens voted against diversity in Bakke on statutory
grounds,'99 he now believes that diversity is a compelling interest.' Jus-
tices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer also have been sympathetic to affirmative
action in other contexts.2"' Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and
Thomas, on the other hand, are probably not going to find that diversity in
education is a compelling interest.2 2
Of the remaining two members, Justice Kennedy's position is unclear,
although he is obviously individualistic in his interpretation of the Four-
teenth Amendment.2 3 Justice O'Connor has hinted that she might support
We think it not useful to pursue the Marks inquiry to the utmost logical possibili-
ty when it has so obviously baffled and divided the lower courts which have con-
sidered it. This degree of confusion following a splintered decision such as
Baldasar is itself a reason for reexamining that decision.
Id. at 1927 (citations omitted).
19 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 408 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting
in part).
See, e.g., Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2127-28 (1995)
(Stevens, J., dissenting); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 315-16 (1986)
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
201 See Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2127-28 (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by Ginsburg &
Breyer, JJ.) (noting that diversity might be a sufficient interest to warrant a race-based
program); id. at 2131 (Souter, J., dissenting, joined by Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ.); id. at
2134 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting, joined by Breyer, J.).
o Justice Rehnquist, of course, voted against affirmative action in Bakke itself, and
little since suggests that he has changed his mind. Justice Scalia's voice in affirmative
action cases has also been clear. His insistence in Adarand that "[i]n the eyes of the
government, we are just one race here. It is American" is wholly inconsistent with the
diversity rationale. 115 S. Ct. at 2119 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment); see also City of Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 520-21 (1989)
(Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (rejecting race conscious programs for those
who are not direct victims even as remedies for past discrimination); Johnson v. Transp.
Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 657 (1987) (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and White, J.,
dissenting). Justice Thomas in Adarand also seemed to propose a strict colorblind stan-
dard which would preclude "benign" consideration of race. "As far as the Constitution
is concerned, it is irrelevant whether a government's racial classifications are drawn by
those who wish to oppress a race or by those who have a sincere desire to help those
thought to be disadvantaged." 115 S. Ct. at 2119 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment). This reasoning would seem to apply to affirmative action
to achieve diversity: "So-called 'benign' discrimination teaches many that because of
chronic and apparently immutable handicaps, minorities cannot compete without their
patronizing indulgence." Id.
203 See, e.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama, 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994). In J.E.B., the majority held
that intentional discrimination against male jurors in using peremptory strikes in jury se-
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a diversity program,2" but she authored the Croson opinion. Both dissent-
ed in Metro Broadcasting v. FCC in ways suggesting disagreement with the
idea that diversity is a compelling interest. 2 5 Nevertheless, the potentially
devastating decrease in the number of minority students on elite campus-
es2 °' that would be occasioned by overruling Bakke would probably make
lection violated the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 1430. In a concurring opinion, Jus-
tice Kennedy asserted that "the neutral phrasing of the Equal Protection Clause, extend-
ing its guarantee to 'any person,' reveals its concerns with individuals, not groups." Id.
at 1434 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
' See Wygant, 476 U.S. at 286 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment) ("[A]ithough its precise contours are uncertain, a state interest in the pro-
motion of racial diversity has been found sufficiently 'compelling,' at least in the con-
text of higher education, to support the use of racial considerations in furthering that
interest.") (citing Board of Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 311-15 (1995)); id. at 288
n.*.
" The majority in Metro Broadcasting made an explicit connection between aca-
demic diversity and broadcast diversity. Metro Broadcasting v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 568
(1990), overruled in part by Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995) (cit-
ing Bakke). Justice O'Connor, writing for herself and Justices Kennedy and Scalia,
made arguments that seem inconsistent with accepting academic diversity as a compel-
ling interest:
[T]he Constitution provides that the Government may not allocate benefits and
burdens among individuals based on the assumption that race or ethnicity deter-
mines how they act or think .... Under the appropriate standard, strict scrutiny,
only a compelling interest may support the Government's use of racial classifica-
tions. Modern equal protection doctrine has recognized only one such interest:
remedying the effects of past discrimination. The interest in increasing the diver-
sity of broadcast viewpoints is clearly not a compelling interest. It is simply too
amorphous, too insubstantial, and too unrelated to any legitimate basis for em-
ploying racial classifications.
Id. at 601, 612 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy's dissent was almost intem-
perate, accusing the majority of disinterring the Court's decision in Plessy v. Ferguson,
and helpfully directing his colleagues to statutes of the South African apartheid regime
and the Third Reich for solutions to the practical problems of race-conscious programs.
Id. at 631-33 & n.1 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Apropos of the diversity rationale, he
wrote: "I cannot agree with this Court that the Constitution permits the Government to
discriminate among its citizens on the basis of race in order to serve interests so trivial
as 'broadcast diversity."' Id. at 633 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Nevertheless, I agree with
Akhil Amar and Neil Katyal, who recognized that Kennedy and O'Connor are crucial
votes, that there are indications that the two Justices' views on Bakke are unfavorable,
and yet conclude that it is not inevitable that they will vote to overrule Bakke. See
Akhil Amar & Neil Katyal, School Colors: Affirmative Action in Education, NEW RE-
PUBLIC, July 17, 1995, at 24.
" UCLA Law School Associate Dean Julian Eule, for example, said that without
affirmative action his school would be virtually all white and Asian. See Jacobius, supra
note 120, at 22. Representatives of Boalt Hall made a similar point. ld; see also Theo-
dore Cross, Suppose There Was No Affirmative Action at the Most Prestigious Colleges
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O'Connor and Kennedy think long and hard before overruling the decision
simply because of its imperfections.
If Bakke is shown to have been a failure, on the other hand, the case for
overruling it becomes much stronger. Academics may applaud the idea of
using Bakke to undermine the unpleasant implications of Justice O'Connor's
opinion in Croson;2 °9 Justice O'Connor may be less likely to see that as a
good reason to preserve Bakke. A passage from Planned Parenthood v.
Casey' seems critical because it represents the views regarding stare de-
cisis of Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, at least two of whom must
support Bakke if it is to survive:
[W]hen this Court reexamines a prior holding, its judgment
is customarily informed by a series of prudential and prag-
matic considerations designed to test the consistency of over-
ruling a prior decision with the ideal of the rule of law, and
to gauge the respective costs of reaffirming and overruling a
prior case. Thus, for example, we may ask whether the rule
has proved to be intolerable simply in defying practical
workability; whether the rule is subject to a special kind of
reliance that would lend a special hardship to the conse-
quences of overruling and add inequity to the cost of repudi-
ation; whether related principles of law have left the old rule
no more than a remnant of abandoned doctrine; or whether
facts have so changed or come to be seen so differently, as
to have robbed the old rule of significant application or justi-
fication. 9
and Graduate Schools, J. BLACKS IN HIGHER EDUC., Spring 1994, at 47 (noting that
"affirmative action plays a huge, if not almost determinative, role in the admission of
African Americans to professional schools"); Theodore Cross, What If There Was No
Affirmative Action in College Admissions? A Further Refinement of Our Earlier Calcu-
lations, J. BLACKS IN HIGHER EDUC., Fall 1994, at 53-54 (estimating that if admissions
were based on standardized test scores, black enrollment at top 25 colleges would drop
from 1,000 to 150; at top 20 law schools from 500 to 100, and at medical schools from
4,000 to 1,000); Ronald J. Ostrow & Sonia Nazario, UC Votes Places Money to State at
Risk Panetta Says, L.A. TIMES, July 25, 1995, at Al ("A study by university officials,
commissioned by the regents, showed that dropping racial preference as an admissions
criterion could reduce the number of black students in the nine-campus [University of
California] system by up to 50 percent.").
See Reginald Alleyne, Regents v. Bakke: Implementing Pre-Bakke Admissions
Policies with post-Bakke Admissions Procedures, 7 BLACK L.J. 290 (1981), for an arti-
cle whose title, in retrospect, turned out to be regrettable.
208 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
Id. at 854-55 (citations omitted); see also United States v. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. 2849,
2864 (1993) (denying that "'when governing decisions are unworkable or are badly rea-
soned, this Court has never felt constrained to follow precedent"') (quoting Payne v.
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If many academic decision-makers choose not to follow Bakke, it will be
hard to insist that Bakkean diversity is "workable," is "more than a remnant
of an abandoned doctrine," or has "significant application and justification."
Accordingly, Bakke risks being overruled.10
B. If It Ain't Broke, Don't Fix It?
Leaving aside for the moment these serious tactical problems, there is a
fairly compelling defense of the status quo. Bakke is the only affirmative
action rationale we have, and the Supreme Court is not likely to offer any
new alternatives in the foreseeable future. For those who support affirmative
action but cannot convince themselves that it is primarily justified by any-
thing other than remedying past discrimination or distributive justice, the
diversity fig leaf exists as a pretext. Because increasing the numbers of
minority lawyers is a positive goal, though illegal, why is this wrong? Per-
haps especially in the area of civil rights, it is difficult to argue that auto-
matic obedience to the law is always the right course. So much progress
was achieved through nonviolent resistance to unjust laws; Rosa Parks and
the heroes and heroines of the lunchcounter sit-ins did the right thing, even
though they may have transgressed laws.211
Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 809 (1991) (internal quotations omitted)).
210 A number of articles discuss the stare decisis analysis of Justices Kennedy,
O'Connor, and Souter in more detail. See, e.g., Carolyn D. Richmond, Note, The
Rehnquist Court: What Is in Store for Constitutional Law Precedent?, 39 N.Y.L. SCH.
L. REV. 511 (1994); see also Andrew M. Jacobs, God Save This Postmodern Court:
The Death of Necessity and the Transformation of the Supreme Court's Overruling
Rhetoric, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 1119 (1995); Paul B. Linton, Planned Parenthood v.
Casey: The Flight from Reason in the Supreme Court, 13 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 15
(1993); Earl M. Maltz, Abortion, Precedent, and the Constitution: A Comment on
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
11 (1992).
211 Cf Leon Higginbotham, Jr., Rosa Parks: Foremother and Heroine Teaching Ci-
vility & Offering a Vision for a Better Tomorrow, 22 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 899 (1995);
Bruce Ledewitz, Perspectives on the Law of the American Sit-In, 16 WHITTIER L. REV.
499 (1995). Of course, lawyers and law schools may have a special obligation to obey
the law. The comparison between academic disobedience to Bakke and Rosa Parks is
imperfect because some academic institutions, rather than openly and proudly sharing
what they are doing, obscure the details of the operation of their programs. In some
well-publicized incidents, confidential admissions information about special admittees
was stolen and disclosed. See Francis Robles, UM Minorities' Admissions Records Sto-
len, MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 28, 1995, at 1B (describing theft of records at University of
Miami Law School and their delivery to student newspaper); Steve Hunter, Confidential
Admissions Data Revealed, RES GESTAE, Oct. 22, 1986, at 1 (report in University of
Michigan Law School student newspaper of comparative admissions statistics of Michi-
gan residents, non-Michigan residents, and minority special admittees); Saundra Torry,
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One reason racial selectivity is wrong is that there are significant costs
to non-preferred minority groups.212 Moreover, preferring some disadvan-
taged minorities but not others delegitimizes the entire diversity project and
cannot help but promote distrust between all racial groups involved. Many
of these costs are borne by disadvantaged minority groups.
C. Non-Diversifying Races Are Disadvantaged by Racially Selective
Programs
Even if particular programs are not motivated entirely by a desire to
achieve diversity, the rhetoric of diversity is still used as a justification.
Non-preferred minorities are stigmatized by schools establishing, through
official policy, that the minorities' presence does not promote diversity, un-
like the presence of other minorities. A preference for some minorities over
others could easily be taken as a judgment that some races are less cultural-
ly valuable or interesting or important than others. In this way, racial selec-
tivity blurs the line between affirmative action and traditional invidious dis-
crimination. Greenawalt argued, for example, that "one can draw a solid
distinction, in terms of possible stigma, between [the] classifications afford-
ing preferential treatment to minority groups and those disadvantaging his-
torically disfavored minorities., 213 A racially selective program simulta-
neously accomplishes both ends.2"4
Black Law Students Assail Author ofArticle on GU Law Admissions, WASH. POST, Apr.
16, 1991, at C1 (describing appropriation of confidential information from student files
which was reported in student newspaper). Although the breach of confidentiality fueled
part of the concern, it seems clear that some also thought disclosure of accurate statis-
tics would be, somehow, harmful or shameful. See Judith Areen, Affirmative Action:
The Benefits of Diversity, WASH. POST, May 26, 1991, at D7 (quoting Georgetown law
dean as noting that "[s]ome observers have wondered why the Law Center has a policy
against publishing median LSAT scores by race"). As Professor Ellen Frankel Paul
wrote, "Why is it that decisions to appoint faculty or select students on the basis of
affirmative action criteria are kept from public scrutiny? . . . If a social policy has to be
conducted with a certain measure of secretiveness, then that says something awfully
damning about it, especially in a democratic society." Ellen Frankel Paul, Careers Open
to Talent, in AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND THE UNIVERSITY, supra note 79, at 256, 257.
212 In addition, it would be very unfortunate for law schools themselves to communi-
cate the idea that evasion of the law, for a purpose one deems good, is acceptable, so
long as there is a reasonable chance of getting away with it. Rosa Parks' protest was all
the more courageous and poignant because she did it proudly.
213 Greenawalt, supra note 79, at 112.
214 See, e.g., Nicolaus Mills, Introduction: To Look Like America, in DEBATING AF-
FIRMATIVE ACTION, RACE, GENDER, ETHNICITY, AND THE POLITICS OF INCLUSION 30
(Nicolaus Mills ed., 1994) ("Traditional discrimination, whether based on race or gen-
der, was invidious. It assumed the inferiority of those it excluded. By contrast, the be-
nign preferences of affirmative action carry with them no stigma. Their aim is
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This stigma cannot be eliminated by whispering, as some law schools
may try to do, that the real purpose is remedying past discrimination, and
that no offense is intended. Because the overt policy is grounded in diversi-
ty, the non-preferred races may well feel maligned. Moreover, even the
excuse that the covert purpose is to remedy disadvantage is not palliating;
the argument that certain races need help to overcome past disadvantage
implies that the discrimination non-preferred minorities have suffered is too
trivial to notice and somehow unworthy of redress." 5
In addition, some of these programs are justified on the ground that it is
important to help create members of the bench and bar who are members of
particular minority groups. Although this is an illegal goal, again, it sends a
signal of the valuation of the race in the eyes of the law school if the law
school helps some races in these areas but not others.
Texas Law School provided an interesting example of this professional
promotion. During the trial challenging his school's affirmative action pro-
gram, Dean Yudof finessed a question regarding the place of Asian-Ameri-
cans in the Texas program.
Q. . . . What about, for example, Asian-American[s:]...
their numbers in the state are so low that they can't elect
anybody or-there's no Asian-Americans, as I under-
stand ... in the state legislature, serv[ing] in government in
an elected capacity .... [S]ince they are not in those posi-
tions of power or their numbers are not great enough to elect
somebody ... are you not concerned about leadership of
Asian-Americans in the bar or in our government?
A .... [I]t appears to be the case due to our population
trends in recent years that Asian-Americans are beginning to
enter the law schools in significant numbers....
Q. Well, if one of your goals is to train these leaders or to
attract these leaders to your school, is there any particular
number that you need to get in there to provide these lead-
ers?
A. No, I don't think there is a particular number. 216
inclusionary, rather than exclusionary ....").
215 In this connection, it may be worth mentioning In re Hong Yen Chang, 24 P. 156
(Cal. 1890) and In re Yamashita, 70 P. 482 (Wash. 1902), cases in which Asian grad-
uates of American law schools were denied the right to practice because they were not
United States citizens, a status which, by federal law, they could not obtain. Thus,
Asian-Americans, the group most often excluded from affirmative action programs,
have a history of de jure exclusion from the legal profession.
216 20 Hopwood Transcript, supra note 36, at 38-40.
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In sum, the Texas program did not undertake to ensure that Asian-Ameri-
cans or Native Americans or non-Mexican-American Latinos and Latinas
had a well-trained body of lawyers ready to lead the bench and bar; if it
happened through market forces, fine, but if not, that seemed fine, too.
Native Americans and Asian-Americans would be foolish if they did not
recognize that this policy sends a message about their relative importance in,
and to, the State of Texas.217
Excluded minorities are directly harmed by racially selective programs
because they compete for a reduced set of spots. If five or fifteen percent of
the places in a class are awarded on the basis of preferences to persons who
otherwise would not have obtained the places, there will be five or fifteen
percent fewer members of the non-preferred minority groups in the
class.218 In this sense, "preferential admissions policies actually disadvan-
tage nonpreferred minorities as well as whites . . ,2 . It is one thing for
whites2' to make other whites pay for discrimination committed by whites
for the benefit of whites, even though the particular individuals who pay
may not have perpetuated or directly benefitted from that discrimination. It
is far less appetizing for whites to say minorities should suffer to compen-
sate other minorities for those wrongful acts.221
217 Arguably, a small minority group needs lawyers to protect its members from
discrimination and abuse even more than a larger group, which may have protection
through the political process.
218 This assumes a proportional distribution at each level of the group of students
who would have been accepted in the absence of an affirmative action program.
219 Greenawalt, supra note 53, at 599.
2 In 1989-90, 90.9% of law school faculty and administrators at ABA-approved
schools were non-Latino or Latina whites. MINORITY DATABOOK, supra note 6, ch. 8,
tbl. VIII-1. Some argue that whites are privileged simply because of their whiteness,
and thus, perpetrators or not, conscious racists or not, benefit from past discrimination.
See, e.g., Thomas Ross, Innocence and Affirmative Action, 48 VAND. L. REV. 297
(1990). This argument does not seem to support the idea that minority groups must be
considered the beneficiaries of, and therefore culpable for, discrimination against other
minority groups.
21 This is particularly so because it is difficult to imagine that any racial group with
the power to refuse to pay for white misconduct against another minority group would
voluntarily agree to do so; instead, they would insist that the whites pay the full freight.
Accordingly, the minority groups that are forced to bear the costs of white discrimina-
tion will be those that are politically weak. With regard to Asian-Americans in particu-
lar, Frank Wu perceives a different danger: "The real risk to Asian Americans is that
they will be squeezed out to provide proportionate representation to whites, not due to
the marginal impact of setting aside a few spaces for African Americans." Frank Wu,
Neither Black nor White: Asian Americans and Affirmative Action, 15 B.C. THIRD
WORLD L.J. 225, 226 (1995). "If they are hurt at all by affirmative action," he argues,
"Asian Americans are harmed no differently from whites." Id. Wu's trenchant analysis
seems to envision a remedial program, where various members of non-white groups
might be differently situated-discrimination against Native Americans would not nec-
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D. A Closed Unrepresentative Group Is Making a Decision of Solomonic
Difficuly
If racial minorities were reluctant to rely on a largely white class of law
school faculty and administrators to determine their level of historical injury
and its present effects, and thus their appropriate share of this and other
social goods, it would be hard to insist that their concern was unjustified.
Few deny that conscious and unconscious racial prejudice continues to exist;
accordingly, it is possible that the racial minorities with which law school
faculties are consciously or unconsciously unsympathetic will have their
claims for redress of past discrimination treated less favorably than other
groups. As Richard Delgado explained, such a system "place[s] the opera-
tion of [affirmative action] in the hands of the very people who brought
about the situation that made it necessary in the first place."222
Then-Professor Guido Calabresi recognized that delegation of this kind
of decision-making authority to university admissions committees was prob-
lematic because the committees were wholly unrepresentative and account-
able to no one:
I am far more willing to trust juries to reflect the unspoken,
and often unspeakable, compromises that the society must
make than I am to trust university admissions committees to
make such decisions. Juries are, after all, popular bodies. No
one jury lasts that long and only a whole series of juries can
shape the unspoken compromise. As such they are relatively
incorruptible (there are too many of them) and relatively
representative of the society whose values they seek to ac-
commodate. None of this is true of university admissions
committees. They are, to put it mildly, utterly unrepresenta-
tive of anything and their value-compromises need have no
relation whatsoever to those of the society at large. Hiding
the choice by leaving it to the university is therefore far
more dangerous than is the analogous delegation to the jury
in euthanasia cases.
223
essarily warrant preferences for Mexican-Americans. Nevertheless, he does not explain
why minorities who are both non-victims and non-beneficiaries should bear any of the
cost of the remedy. Moreover, Wu's reasoning would seem not to apply to a program
driven by diversity, where members of non-white groups that are not preferred might be
similarly situated to those that are.
2 Richard Delgado, Affirmative Action as a Majoritarian Device: Or, Do You Really
Want to Be a Role Model?, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1222, 1225 (1991).
' Guido Calabresi, Bakke as Pseudo-Tragedy, 28 CATH. U. L. REV. 427, 431-32
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In addition, Professor Calabresi perceived that the covert nature of the pro-
cess opened the door to political, even discriminatory, results:
Moreover, the standard universities are to ap-
ply-diversity-has been sufficiently used by them in the
past to disfavor disadvantaged groups that it should give one
pause as the basis for the "acceptable," if unspoken and
unreviewable, decisions of today. When we must avert the
eyes, we should try to do it in a way which gives us some
confidence that what happens where we do not look will
reflect the conflict of societal values at stake instead of oth-
er, perhaps self-serving interests.224
An example from the University of Texas suggests that the problem may
be genuine. In 1990, a committee at the University of Texas Law School
voted to increase the coverage of the program to include more Latino and
Latina groups, such as Puerto Ricans and Central Americans, as well as dis-
advantaged groups such as "American Indians, Vietnamese boat-people and
Appalachians."2" Dean Yudof, however, opposed the change on the
ground that "in the aggregate ... a more compelling case could be made for
Mexican-Americans and African-Americans., 226
Recent immigrants such as Central Americans and Vietnamese may
stand on a different footing when it comes to their entitlement to redress for
past discrimination by the United States. In addition, the Appalachians are
white, and are arguably a privileged group based on that circumstance alone.
Nevertheless, the judgment that Native Americans and Puerto Ricans un-
questionably have a distinctly better history in the United States than Mexi-
can-Americans and African-Americans seems fairly difficult to defend;
namely, it is difficult to choose between the forcible expulsion and genocide
Native Americans experienced and the kidnapping and slavery imposed on
African-Americans. In short, if there is such a thing as racism, or even a
lack of complete empathy and understanding between members of different
races, minority groups are entitled to be wary of allowing their just share of
societal resources to be determined by a closed and unrepresentative process
dominated by members of other races.
(1979) (footnotes omitted).
22 Id. at 432.
' 20 Hopwood Transcript, supra note 36, at 45-46.
20 id. at 47.
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E. Racial Selectivity Puts Disfavored Minorities in an Untenable Position
Finally, a racially selective affirmative action program puts disfavored
minorities in an impossible and unfair dilemma. Law school administrators
discriminate against certain minorities through a program allegedly grounded
in diversity, but which is really designed to increase the representation of
other minorities. Accordingly, non-favored minority groups are actually
worse off than they would have been without any affirmative action pro-
gram. The disfavored minorities must either accept being discriminated
against, or, in effect, sue other persons of color. Neither choice is good; it is
unfair for minorities to be put in that untenable position.
CONCLUSION
Bakkean diversity cannot quite do the job that many university adminis-
trators wish it could: Bakkean diversity cannot justify representation of vari-
ous groups proportionate to their population, cannot justify remedying past
discrimination, and it cannot help some minorities while leaving others un-
aided. A few schools use diversity as Justice Powell seemed to envision it,
offering admissions advantages to all non-whites, even though that may
result in helping people who are merely interesting, not disadvantaged.
Many others cannot bring themselves to go that far, and instead select the
groups to favor with preferences, based on rationales that are different from
Bakkean diversity per se. This task is nearly impossible to accomplish in a
way that can leave the disadvantaged groups feeling fairly treated. We know
that it is bad for a Mexican-American to be discriminated against because a
predominantly white school prefers to admit whites; it has yet to be demon-
strated that it is morally or legally acceptable for a Mexican-American to
lose a law school slot because a predominantly white school prefers to admit
African-Americans or vice-versa.
The experience of implementing Bakke in the law schools has shown
that the power to discriminate on the basis of race is hard to confine. Allow-
ing people to make distinctions on the basis of race invites creation of a
racial hierarchy based on the beliefs of the decision-makers or on political
considerations. This phenomenon is no less true for "benign" programs than
it is for ones that are invidiously motivated. It is a power that is difficult not
to abuse, and, equally importantly, it is virtually impossible to avoid the
appearance of abuse, for all groups of non-white Americans perceive that
they have been discriminated against in the past and understandably resist
the suggestion that the wrongs done to them are not significant compared to
those experienced by others.
Yet the alternative of having little or no representation of the various
American races in law schools is unacceptable. Even if "diversity" is not an
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entirely coherent or logical doctrine, it is the only available tool, and, where
representation is impossible without it, "diversity" has to be used. Schools
should follow rules that Bakke laid down, and seek a diverse diversity rather
than one transparently designed to achieve other goals. If schools do not
begin to treat Bakke with respect, it will be taken away.
POSTSCRIPT
While this Article was in page proofs, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit issued its opinion in Hopwood v. Texas.' Al-
though there was not sufficient time to substantially revise the Article, I am
grateful to the editors of the Journal for giving me the opportunity to add
what is out of necessity a hurried discussion of this decision.
One aim of this Article was to encourage schools to comply with Bakke,
lest their open rejection of the decision convince the Supreme Court that
Bakke was not commanding precedent, and should be overruled on that
ground. The decision in Hopwood suggests that the time for implementing
that strategy is rapidly running out.
In a split decision, two judges of the Fifth Circuit held that Bakke was
no longer good law, and therefore concluded that race could not be taken
into account in admissions decisions in order to achieve diversity.227 The
third judge said that the court need not reach the question of Bakke's vitality
because the case could be decided based on other flaws in the Texas pro-
gram.22
Although, as discussed below, the Fifth Circuit's opinion was procedur-
ally questionable in several ways, 29 the reasoning of the majority could
plausibly come out of the mouths of members of the conservative wing of
the United States Supreme Court. Texas has announced plans to appeal the
Fifth Circuit's decision to the Supreme Court.23 Texas might avoid a deci-
Nos. 94-50569 & 94-50664, 1996 WL 120235 (5th Cir. Mar. 18, 1996).
2 See infra notes 256-59 and accompanying text. Hopwood also addressed the issue
of affirmative action as a remedial measure, which was another ground of justification
for the Texas program. This issue is beyond the scope of this Article and will not be
addressed here.
2' See infra notes 260-64 and accompanying text.
, See infra notes 267-76 and accompanying text.
See Texas to Press Issue of Admissions Policy, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 1996, at B9
(quoting Texas Attorney General as stating that Texas will petition for certiorari in the
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sion on the merits of Bakke's validity, if, for example, the Supreme Court
decides that the Fifth Circuit decided more than it had to in order to grant
complete relief. Now that Bakke has been bloodied, however, it seems un-
likely that the Supreme Court can avoid the issue for long. If the Supreme,
Court uses Hopwood to revisit the merits of Bakke, the unfavorable record
makes it more likely that Bakke will be overruled.
What follows is a summary of the litigation, and thoughts on the impli-
cations for the arguments made earlier in this Article.
A. Hopwood in the District Court
Hopwood v. Texas23' began when four white law school applicants
sued the University of Texas Law School, complaining that they had been
denied admission while African-Americans and Mexican-Americans with
lower LSAT scores and GPAs had been offered admission.f 2 In 1992, the
year the plaintiffs were denied admission, the law school had one admis-
sions committee for African-Americans and Mexican-Americans and a sepa-
rate committee for Native Americans, Asian-Americans, non-Mexican-Amer-
ican Latinos and Latinas, and whites.233 Texas also set distinct numerical
cut-offs for African-American, Mexican-Americans, and others.'z
Texas advanced several rationales for its affirmative action program,
including promoting diversity, providing increased opportunities for the
largest minority groups in Texas, and remedying past discrimination by the
University of Texas and the Texas educational system. 5 The district court
agreed that diversity and remedying past discrimination were compelling
interests. Nevertheless, relying on Justice Powell's decision in Bakke, the
district court held that the law school's use of separate committees was
unconstitutional.236
The district court then dealt Texas a joker on the issue of which party
carries the burden of proof on the issue of remedy. Concretely, did the
plaintiffs have to prove that they would have been admitted, or did Texas
have to prove that they would not? The court acknowledged that in Carey v.
Piphus3 7 and Mt. Healthy City School Board of Education v. Doyle,238
the Supreme Court held that "[g]enerally, in cases where a plaintiff estab-
Supreme Court).
231 861 F. Supp. 551 (W.D. Tex. 1994), rev'd, Nos. 94-50569 & 94-50664, 1996 WL
120235 (5th Cir. Mar. 18, 1996).
232 Id. at 553.
233 Id. at 558.
234 Id. at 561-62.
23' id. at 569-70.
236 Id. at 578-79.
23- 435 U.S. 247 (1978).
238 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
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lishes a constitutional deprivation, the burden shifts to the defendant" to
justify adverse treatment of the plaintiff.239 One might have assumed that a
litigant or judge to whom Bakke was important might eschew arguments that
lines of Supreme Court authority had been overruled by implication. Nev-
ertheless, at the urging of the University of Texas, the trial court declined to
follow Mt. Healthy and Carey based on a recent Supreme Court case which
held that the burden of proof lay with the plaintiffs." °
The recent case, St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks,2" was a Title VII
decision that dealt not with the burden of proof for establishing a remedy
for a proven violation, but with the distinct question of how a legal violation
is to be proved in the first instance. 2 St. Mary's was a controversial re-
finement of the prima facie case and rebuttal system set up in Title VII
employment discrimination cases by McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green. 3 Under McDonnell Douglas, a plaintiff must prove membership in
a protected group and that they applied for an available job they were quali-
fied to perform.'2 Once this prima facie case is made out, the burden
shifts to the employer to offer a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for
the action.'l The plaintiff then has the opportunity to show that the reason
proffered by the defendant was pretextual 6
The Court in St. Mary's held that a factfinder's disbelief of the
defendant's non-discriminatory reason did not necessarily mean that the
plaintiff had proved discrimination. In addition to proving that the allegedly
Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. at 579 (citing Carey, 435 U.S. at 263; Mt. Healthy, 429
U.S. at 287); see also Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro Hous. Dev. Corp., 429
U.S. 252, 270 n.21 (1977) (holding that proof of partial discriminatory motive would
shift to the defendant "the burden of establishing that the same decision would have
resulted even had the impermissible purpose not been considered").
'o The district court opinion attributed this argument to the defendants. Id. at 579
("The defendants argue that the burden is on the plaintiffs to prove they would have
been admitted.").
21 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1992).
242 The argument that St. Mary's undermined Mt. Healthy and Carey was also prob-
lematic for a party purportedly concerned about civil rights because if the argument
succeeded, it would ultimately impair judicial enforcement of civil rights. Future dis-
crimination victims would be much less likely to get relief from those who mistreated
them. That is to say, Texas advanced an anti-civil rights argument. In this particular
case it might be advantageous, but in most cases, it would hurt women and people of
color victimized by discrimination. If the burden had been on the plaintiff to prove that
the result would have been different, Linda Brown, the plaintiff in Brown v. Board of
Education, might still be litigating the question of whether she was "qualified" to go to
public school in Topeka.
3 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
244 Id. at 802.
5 Id. at 802-03.
246 Id. at 804-05.
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legitimate reason was pretextual, the plaintiff had to prove that the real
reason was discrimination. Thus, the Supreme Court said, a jury could dis-
believe a defendant's claim that an employee was fired for a particular legit-
imate reason and yet find for the defendant if it concluded that the real
reason was a legitimate reason other than race.2 47
In Hopwood, the district court's holding that St. Mary's impaired Mt.
Healthy was more than a stretch. There is not even a logical inconsistency
between the cases. The court could have easily applied St. Mary's to the
issue of proving a legal violation, and then applied Mt. Healthy to the dis-
tinct issue of determining a remedy.
Even if some tension existed between the cases, it was by no means
inevitable that Mt. Healthy would have to bend for consistency's sake. Mt.
Healthy and Hopwood were constitutional cases; St. Mary's was a Title VII
case. The concept of having special protection for constitutional rights
should be familiar to every lawyer and judge. 8 In addition, the
McDonnell Douglas regime that St. Mary's refined is used in cases of dis-
crimination inferred from conduct; it does not apply at all "where the plain-
tiff presents direct evidence of discrimination." '249 In Hopwood, the Univer-
sity of Texas Law School employed an express racial classification.
Finally, the Court in St. Mary's said nothing about overruling cases.
Indeed, after St. Mary's was decided, and before the district court issued its
opinion in Hopwood, the Supreme Court cited Carey with apparent approv-
al." ° At best, a district court might ruminate that a Supreme Court which
would issue an opinion like that of St. Mary's might do many unpredictable
and undesirable things, such as overrule or limit any number of cases sup-
portive of civil rights. The district court, however, made no plausible argu-
ment that the Court had actually done so.2" Nevertheless, the district court
gave the plaintiffs only dollar damages and an opportunity to reapply for
admission without charge. 2
Texas, then, was in a funny position. It had a total victory. The law
school was free to reform the details of its admissions program to comply
with Bakke, and thus discourage copycat litigation. Although it was nice that
the law school did not have to admit the plaintiffs, that part of the judg-
St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2749 (1992).
24 See, e.g., Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967) (holding that prosecution
must prove that constitutional errors are harmless beyond a reasonable doubt).
9 Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985).
See Heck v. Humphrey, 114 S. Ct. 2364, 2370 (1994).
4' Even if there were an argument that the Mt. Healthy line of cases had been under-
mined by the reasoning of subsequent cases, Supreme Court doctrine required the lower
court to follow the precedents until overruled by the Supreme Court. See infra notes
267-72 and accompanying text.
252 Hopwood v. Texas, 861 F. Supp. 551 (W.D. Tex. 1994), rev'd, Nos. 94-50569 &
94-50664, 1996 WL 120235 (5th Cir. Mar. 18, 1996).
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ment-the least important issue in the case by a wide margin-was entirely
unsustainable on appeal, based on the rationale of the district court. One of
the great mysteries of Hopwood is why Texas did not accept its victory and
go home: confess error on the question of which party bears the burden of
proof in establishing a remedy, or even settle the case by admitting the
plaintiffs and paying them to go away. This course would have protected the
district court decision from possibly hostile scrutiny by the Fifth Circuit or
the Supreme Court.
B. Hopwood in the Fifth Circuit
Hopwood in the Fifth Circuit was a clash of titans. For the plaintiffs,
Theodore Olson weighed in from the Washington office of Los Angeles
powerhouse Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher; Olson had been in charge of the
Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel during President Reagan's
first term. A platoon of lawyers from the hometown favorite Vinson &
Elkins represented Texas, joined by, among others, the legendary Charles
Alan Wright of the Texas Law School faculty. As expected, the plaintiffs
attacked Bakke. Ironically, these critics of racial diversity pointed out that
minorities excluded from the special admissions program suffered as a re-
sult." Texas continued to defend its racially selective program, insisting
that building the African-American and Mexican-American bar was a com-
pelling interest."
More than a year and a half after the district court decision, a panel of
the Fifth Circuit decided the plaintiffs' appeal. On the bench were Judges
Jerry E. Smith, Jacques Wiener, and Harold DeMoss. No judge questioned
the determination by the trial judge that separate admissions committees
were unconstitutional. In addition, all agreed that the decision on which
party bears the burden of proving the remedy was wrong; the Fifth Circuit
" Counsel for Plaintiffs Hopwood and Carvell argued:
The preferences for two and only two racial or ethnic groups at the expense of all
others, demonstrates that defendants' real interest is in something other than "di-
versity" as Justice Powell used that term in Bakke. The contribution to "diversity"
that may be made by non-Mexican Hispanic Americans, Asian Americans, Native
Americans, or other minorities are trivialized by the process.
Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants Hopwood and Carvell at 21, Hopwood v. Texas, Nos. 94-
50569 & 94-50664, 1996 WL 120235 (5th Cir. Mar. 18, 1996); see also Reply Brief for
Plaintiffs-Appellants Hopwood and Carvell at 12, Hopwood (Nos. 94-50569 & 94-
50664).
14 Brief of Appellees at 23-24, Hopwood (Nos. 94-50569 & 94-50664) [hereinafter
Appellees' Brief]; see also id. at 25-26 (arguing that "seeking more than trivial repre-
sentation of blacks and Mexican Americans at the Law School furthers the diversity
objective of preparing future lawyers, judges, and legislators of all races to deal effec-
tively with Texas' two largest minority communities.")
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held that Texas, the proven discriminator, was required to bear the burden
of proving that it would have denied these students admission under a law-
ful system." No member of the court found the question of remedy, the
only issue that had made it worthwhile for Texas to suffer an appeal rather
than concede outright, to be close. The judges split, though, on the issue of
what Should happen next.
A majority consisting of Judges Smith and DeMoss concluded that the
question of diversity as a compelling interest for equal protection analysis
was at issue in the appeal, and to them the issue was not difficult. "Justice
Powell's view in Bakke is not binding precedent on this issue. While he
announced the judgment, no other Justice joined in that part of the opinion
discussing the diversity rationale.""5 6 The court of appeals thus considered
itself free to determine the issue unconstrained by Bakke.
The majority concluded that the reasoning of Bakke had been under-
mined by subsequent Supreme Court cases. "We agree with the plaintiffs,"
the court said, "that any consideration of race or ethnicity by the law school
for the purpose of achieving a diverse student body is not a compelling
interest under the Fourteenth Amendment." ' 7 They observed that the only
other Supreme Court case treating diversity as a compelling or important
interest, Metro Broadcasting, had been undercut by Adarand Constructors v.
Pena.5 8 Under Croson, and the dissents in Metro Broadcasting, diversity
was not a compelling interest, and Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke, the
court concluded, was no longer supportable.5 9
Judge Wiener agreed that the 1992 Texas admissions program was un-
constitutional, but based that determination on different grounds. He insisted
that the court need not decide the validity of Bakke to decide the case, and
that thus the majority violated the principle that constitutional issues would
be reached only when necessary.' Although the wholesale rejection of
Bakke by the majority made consideration of the fine points of the Texas
program unnecessary, Judges Moss and Smith did not overlook the racially
255 Hopwood, 1996 WL 120235, at *20-21; id. at *30 (Wiener, J., specially concur-
ring).
I2 d. at *10.
257 Id.
258 Id. (citing Adarand, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995), overruling in part, Metro Broadcast-
ing v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990)).
" Id. at *11 (citing City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 496
(1989); Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 612).
o Id. at *28 & n.14 (Wiener, J., specially concurring) (citing Rust v. Sullivan, 500
U.S. 172, 224 (1991) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (noting that "[i]t is a fundamental rule
of judicial restraint ... that this Court will not reach constitutional questions in advance
of the necessity of deciding them") (citing Three Affiliated Tribes v. Wold Eng'g, P.C.,
467 U.S. 138, 157 (1984)).
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selective nature of the program. 61 The invalidity of this feature of the pro-
gram was the basis for Judge Wiener's concurrence:
[B]lacks and Mexican Americans are but two among any
number of racial or ethnic groups that could and presumably
should contribute to genuine diversity. By singling out only
those two ethnic groups, the initial stage of the law school's
1992 admissions process ignored altogether non-Mexican
Hispanic Americans, Asian Americans, and Native Ameri-
cans, to name but a few.
In this light, the limited racial effects of the law school's
preferential admissions process, targeting exclusively blacks
and Mexican Americans, more closely resembles a set aside
or quota system for those two disadvantaged minorities than
it does an academic admissions program narrowly tailored to
achieve true diversity .... Accordingly, I would find that the
law school's race-based 1992 admissions process was not
narrowly tailored to achieve diversity and hold it constitu-
tionally invalid on that basis. By so doing I would avoid the
largely uncharted waters of a compelling interest analy-
sis. 2
62
Judge Wiener's conclusion that the majority did not have to determine
the validity of Bakke to afford the plaintiffs complete relief is plausible; as
he said, the case "is not a class action. ',2 63 Wiener would have granted the
plaintiffs a hearing on whether they would have been admitted under a con-
stitutional program under the correct standard, that is, with the burden of
proof on the defendants.'
It is true that based on the relief Judge Wiener would have granted, a
more searching reexamination of Bakke would have been unwarranted. Nev-
ertheless, the majority granted broader relief. In addition to a hearing on
monetary damages, the majority awarded plaintiffs an opportunity "to reap-
ply under an admissions system that invokes none of these serious constitu-
tional infirmities. '"" Given this relief, it arguably was defensible for the
26 Id. at *1 ("The beneficiaries of this system are blacks and Mexican Americans, to
the detriment of whites and non-preferred minorities."); id. at *30, n.4 ("As blacks and
Mexican Americans were the only two minority categories granted preferential treat-
ment in admissions, it is inaccurate to say that the law school conducted separate ad-
missions programs for 'minorities' and 'non-minorities."').
262 Id. at *29 (Wiener, J., specially concurring).
23 Id. at *30 (Wiener, J., specially concurring).
Id. (Wiener, J., specially concurring).
265 Id. at *26.
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appeals court to have examined the validity of any admissions program
under which the plaintiffs would reapply. Reapplication relief will be redun-
dant if Texas cannot prove that the plaintiffs would have been denied admis-
sion under a constitutional program-if admitted after that procedure, there
will be no need to apply again. Nevertheless, it is hard to contend that the
majority awarded unnecessary relief to give itself the opportunity to decide
the broader issue when the relief that justified the analysis-an opportunity
to reapply to the law school-had been ordered by the district court as
well.26
There are other procedural reasons, however, that the decision was ques-
tionable. The rule laid down by the Supreme Court in Rodriguez de Quijas
v. Shearson/American Express, Inc. 7 is that the Court reserves the prerog-
ative of overruling its own cases, even if a decision appears to have been
undermined by subsequent authority of the Court.2 8 "If a precedent of this
Court has direct application in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected
in some other line of decisions, the Court of Appeals should follow the case
which directly controls, leaving to this Court the prerogative of overruling
its own decisions."" Thus, even if a decision seems "wobbly, an inferior
court cannot disregard it."'27 This rule is well-known in the Fifth Circuit;
indeed, it was cited in Wilkerson v. Whitley, 271 an en banc decision written
in 1994 by Hopwood majority author Jerry Smith himself.272
Educational affirmative action seems the kind of issue for which this
doctrine was designed. The majority was right to conclude that in recent
years, the Supreme Court has been increasingly suspicious of affirmative
action. Yet, it is also true that none of their holdings inescapably compel the
conclusion that Bakke is dead. As Judge Wiener pointed out, the Supreme
Court might well find that in the special context of education, racial diversi-
2 Hopwood v. Texas, 861 F. Supp. 551, 585 (W.D. Tex. 1994), rev'd, Nos. 94-
50569 & 94-50664, 1996 WL 120235 (5th Cir. Mar. 18, 1996). Moreover, the
defendants' brief seems to agree that whether diversity is a compelling interest is at
issue; issue 1 of the statement of issues is "Did the district court properly find that
Defendants had a strong basis in fact to conclude that affirmative action was needed to
meet compelling state interests." Appellees' Brief, supra note 254, at 1.
267 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
26 Thanks to Izhak Englard, James Gardner, George Martinez, Margaret Taylor, and
Mark Tushnet for providing helpful cases on this issue.
269 Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 484; accord. American Trucking Ass'ns v.
Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 180 (1990) (plurality opinion).
270 United States v. Six Hundred Thirty Nine Thousand Five Hundred & Fifty Eight
Dollars ($639,558) in United States Currency, 955 F.2d 712, 718 (D.C. Cir. 1992); see
also Butts v. City of N.Y. Dep't of Hous. Preservation & Dev., 990 F.2d 1397 (2d Cir.
1993).
271 28 F.3d 498 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 740 (1995).
272 Id. at 503-04 & n.8.
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ty is a legitimate criterion, even if that consideration might be impermissible
in the context of employment or contracting. 73
Invocation of Rodriguez, of course, assumes that Bakke is an authorita-
tive decision of the Supreme Court. The Hopwood majority found to the
contrary, but surprisingly they made no mention of the Marks test, the stan-
dard that the Supreme Court uses to analyze the question.274 Several Fifth
Circuit cases applied Marks, 5 so this omission is peculiar. Although the
Fifth Circuit could arguably reach one of several interpretations of Bakke
under Marks,276 they were not free to ignore it entirely. It may be that they
were unaware of Marks; it is mentioned nowhere in the briefs of the plain-
tiffs or the defendants, or in the opinions of the court.
That the Supreme Court should frown on the Fifth Circuit's violation of
procedural customs does not mean they will disagree with the bottom line.
Rodriguez, after all, was an affirmance; if the Court concludes that the Fifth
Circuit usurped its authority but was right, it also will affirm Hopwood.
Regardless of whether the Supreme Court finds a holding in Bakke through
application of the Marks test, it can overrule itself even if the Fifth Circuit
cannot. The result in Hopwood, hostile to affirmative action, is a perfectly
dreadful and perfectly plausible concatenation of a decade of anti-affirmative
action rulings of the Supreme Court.
Whatever the ultimate outcome, the Hopwood litigation supports the
thesis of this Article in several respects. First, Bakke is law.2' Schools that
do not follow Bakke and are sued can expect to lose. By openly refusing to
follow Bakke, Texas simultaneously invited a lawsuit challenging it and
ensured that the suit would succeed.
The separate admissions committees were a relatively minor transgres-
sion. Though unwise, realistically they do not make affirmative action either
more or less problematic than it already is. But through that small vulnera-
bility, they gave the enemies of affirmative action the opportunity for wide-
ranging judicial scrutiny of the Texas program, including the practice of
7 See Hopwood v. Texas, 861 F. Supp. 551 (W.D. Tex. 1994), rev'd, Nos. 94-
50569 & 94-50664, 1996 WL 120235, at *28 & nn.18-21 (5th Cir. Mar. 18, 1996)
(Wiener, J., specially concurring).
274 See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
275 See, e.g., Campbell v. St. Tamany Parish Sch. Bd., 64 F.3d 184, 189 (5th Cir.
1995); Islamic Ctr. v. City of Starkville, 876 F.2d 465, 471 (5th Cir. 1989); Stegmaier
v. Trammell, 597 F.2d 1027, 1033 (5th Cir. 1979).
276 See supra notes 195-98 and accompanying text.
27 That is, the best case scenario is that Bakke is law. With Justices Brennan, Mar-
shall, Blackmun, and White off the Court, it seems unlikely that Bakke will be expand-
ed any time soon.
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picking and choosing among historically disfavored minorities. This litiga-
tion shows that every program vulnerable to suit on the ground that it vio-
lates even a minor feature of Bakke is also an opportunity for affirmative
action opponents to argue that Bakke has been or should be overruled.
From the point of view of those who want to save Bakke, litigation
should be avoided or settled, not pursued aggressively. The decision to de-
fend racial selectivity-on the ground of diversity-put Texas in a position
where it had to get the Fifth Circuit, and now the Supreme Court, to swal-
low a lot to sustain Bakke. Texas seems to be trying to stand Carolene
Products278 on its head. Instead of justifying a classification because it
protected "discrete and insular minorities"279 -the smallest and least pow-
erful-it asked for deference to its decision because it helped the "two larg-
est minority communities in Texas." The Fifth Circuit and the Supreme
Court are apparently being asked to support an interpretation of Bakke that
permits race-based discrimination against tiny groups of Vietnamese-Ameri-
cans and Native Americans in Texas in part because they are small and
politically powerless. Bakke cannot bear this much pressure without break-
ing.
To the extent that it justifies its program on diversity, Texas also has to
convince the courts that Bakke was intended to consecrate university admis-
sions committees as race-judges with authority far beyond, for example, the
comparatively puny powers granted to Congress under Section V of the
Fourteenth Amendment. If Texas was within its rights here, then Bakke gave
admissions committees plenary discretion to help or hurt minorities based on
whatever view of diversity they happen to hold; one school can say every
minority group but Native Americans gets a preference, another in the next
county can say only Native Americans are to be helped, and both schools
are wholly within their rights if they can articulate some reason for their
choices. Judge Wiener, consistent with this Article, agreed that this just is
not diversity.
Maybe Texas can dodge the bullet in the Supreme Court. Perhaps the
Court will conclude that the Fifth Circuit reached a constitutional issue
when it did not have to, and dispose of the case without revisiting Bakke.
Perhaps the appeal will become moot. Or, although it seems improbable,
maybe the Supreme Court will wait for another case before taking one simi-
lar to Hopwood.
Clearly, though, for those who wish to save Bakke, Hopwood is not the
case to test Bakke on the merits. The Texas program apparently violated
Bakke both because of the separate admission committees, and because of
its racial selectivity. Texas, which has seemingly refused to follow Bakke, is
not the party to insist that the Supreme Court should. What will be the an-
278 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
279 Id. at 153 n. 4.
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swer to the plaintiffs' assertion that because the best legal minds in the
country cannot understand and apply Bakke, it is, ipso facto, an unworkable
standard?
If fortune smiles, Hopwood will be just a scare. Beginning now, Ameri-
can universities and professional schools should get right with Bakke. If
Bakke is to survive, the case that goes to the Supreme Court must be on a
record demonstrating that it can work.
